State Marriage Amendments and Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy, and Constitutional Limitations by Strasser, Mark
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 25 | Issue 1 Article 2
2007
State Marriage Amendments and Overreaching:
On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy, and
Constitutional Limitations
Mark Strasser
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Mark Strasser, State Marriage Amendments and Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy, and Constitutional Limitations, 25
Law & Ineq. 59 (2007).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol25/iss1/2
State Marriage Amendments and
Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good




Over the past decade, several states have amended their
respective constitutions to limit marriage to unions between one
man and one woman, and more states are expected to consider
similar amendments in coming years.' While all of these
amendments remove possible protections in the state constitutions
for same-sex marriages, they differ in important ways. The
amendments have the potential to cause far-reaching and
unforeseen effects because the language in the amendments is
open to broad construction. The amendments have the potential
to put a variety of groups and their families at risk in ways that
fairness and good public policy cannot justify.
Part I of this Article discusses how the various marriage
amendments might affect particular groups. Part II discusses the
federal constitutional implications of broadly construing these
amendments. This article concludes that courts should construe
these amendments narrowly to mitigate the harm they
undoubtedly will cause. Not only do the amendments conflict with
the principles of fairness, statutory construction, and good public
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. See generally New Group Will Push for Gay-Marriage Referendum,
RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, June 22, 2005, at B9, available at 2005 WLNR
9901690.
A grassroots organization has been formed to push for an amendment to
the Virginia Constitution that would ban same-sex marriages. The 2005
General Assembly easily approved the proposed amendment. If it passes
again in next year's legislative session, it can be submitted to the voters in
a referendum in November 2006.
Id.; see also Amy Fagan, Gay 'marriage' may affect Hillary, WASH. TIMEs, July 11,
2006, A12, available at WLNR 11948324 ('Twenty states have enacted
amendments protecting traditional marriage, and at least five more states will vote
on amendments in November.").
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policy, a broad reading exposes their vulnerability to
constitutional attack.
I. The Language of the Amendments
The language of the amendments varies in important ways.
While it is difficult to speculate as to their respective legal effects
before state courts have an opportunity to construe them, it is
plausible to believe that some courts interpreting these
amendments will construe them quite broadly.
A. State Marriage Amendments Vary Greatly in Text
All of the amendments remove the possibility of state
constitutional protection for same-sex marriages, and almost all go
a step further by precluding state legislatures from recognizing
same-sex marriages. Where the amendments differ significantly
from one another is in the additional measures they take to
preclude same-sex couples from marrying.
Hawaii is the only state with a marriage amendment that
gives the state legislature the power to determine whether same-
sex marriages are recognizable. 2  Several state marriage
amendments do not permit the recognition of marriages not
composed of one man and one woman.3  Some of these
constitutional provisions also ban recognition of other kinds of
relationships substantially similar to marriage. 4  Other
2. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998) ("The Legislature shall have the power
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.").
3. See e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (1998) ("To be valid or recognized in this
State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman."); MISS. CONST.
§ 263-A (2004);
Marriage may take place and be valid under the laws of this state only
between a man and a woman. A marriage in another state or foreign
jurisdiction between persons of the same gender, regardless of when the
marriage took place, may not be recognized in this state, and is void and
unenforceable under the laws of this state.
Id.; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (2004) ("That to be valid and recognized in this state, a
marriage shall exist only between a man and a woman."); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, §
7 (2004) ("Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or
recognized as a marriage in this state."); NEv. CONST. art. I, § 21 (2001) ("Only a
marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized and given effect in
this state."); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5(a) (2004) ("It is the policy of Oregon, and its
political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall
be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.").
4. ARK. CONST. amdt. 83, §§ 2-3 (2004).
(2) Legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially
similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas,
except that the legislature may recognize a common-law marriage from
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amendments seem to impose further limitations depending upon
how they are construed.5 However, even an amendment that on
another state between a man and a woman.
(3) The legislature has the power to determine the capacity of persons to
marry, subject to this amendment, and the legal rights, obligations,
privileges, and immunities of marriage.
Id; Ky. CONST. § 233A (2004) ("Only a marriage between one man and one woman
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be
valid or recognized."); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (1999) ("Only marriage between a
man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two
persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar
same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska."); N.D. CONST.
art. XI, § 28 (2004) ("Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a
woman. No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a
marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect."); S.D. CONST.
art. XXI, § 9 (2005) ("Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or
recognized in South Dakota. The uniting of two or more persons in a civil union,
domestic partnership, or other quasi-marital relationship shall not be valid or
recognized in South Dakota."); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (2005) ("(a) Marriage in this
state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. (b) This state or a
political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status
identical or similar to marriage."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (2004) ("(1) Marriage
consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. (2) No other domestic
union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same
or substantially equivalent legal effect.").
5. GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, para. 1 (2004).
(a) This state shall recognize as marriage only the union of man and
woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this
state.
(b) No union between persons of the same sex shall be recognized by this
state as entitled to the benefits of marriage. This state shall not give effect
to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other state or
jurisdiction respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other state or jurisdiction.
The courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or
separate maintenance with respect to any such relationship or otherwise
to consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights arising as a
result of or in connection with such relationship.
Id; Kan. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (2005).
(a) The marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil contract.
Marriage shall be constituted by one man and one woman only. All other
marriages are declared to be contrary to the public policy of this state and
are void.
(b) No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized by the
state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of marriage.
Id; La. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (2004).
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one
man and one woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall
construe this constitution or any state law to require that marriage or the
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a union other
than the union of one man and one woman. A legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall
not be valid or recognized. No official or court of the state of Louisiana
shall recognize any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which is
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its face seems only to preclude the recognitior of same-sex
marriages or civil unions might be construed much more broadly. 6
Thus, while all of the amendments preclude a challenge to a
state's same-sex marriage ban on state constitutional grounds,
some inevitably impose yet-to-be determined burdens on a variety
of individuals or relationships.
B. The Opportunity Costs Associated with the Passage of the
Different Amendments
There are a number of ways to analyze the degree to which
these amendments impose burdens on same-sex and different-sex
couples. One method is to evaluate the range of benefits that may
not the union of one man and one woman.
Id; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (2004) ("To secure and preserve the benefits of
marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union of one
man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a
marriage or similar union for any purpose."); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (2004).
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in
or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its
political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the
design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.
Id; OKLA. CONST. art. 1I, § 35 (2004).
(a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and
one woman. Neither this Constitution nor any other provision of law shall
be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
(b) A marriage between persons of the same gender performed in another
state shall not be recognized as valid and binding in this state as of the
date of the marriage.
(c) Any person knowingly issuing a marriage license in violation of this
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id; VA. CONST. art. I, §15-A (2005) (proposed).
(a) That only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage
valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions.
(b) This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that
intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effects of
marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political subdivisions
create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal status to
which is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of
marriage.
Id.
6. See Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (2005) (striking
down broadly construed Nebraska amendment which, on its face, only precludes
the recognition of same-sex marriages and marriage-like unions.), rev'd, 455 F.3d
859 (2006), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (2006); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (1999)
("Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in
Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic
partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized
in Nebraska.").
STATE MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS
no longer be awarded by the state legislature to unmarried
individuals or couples. Another method is to investigate which
groups are affected by the state constitution's prohibition on
awarding the benefits at issue. A third is to examine which
symbolic or tangible benefits would have been afforded but for the
amendment. The degree to which the various amendments are
viewed as burdensome will vary greatly depending upon which of
the above is the method of the analysis.
In many, but not all states, opponents of the amendments
have argued that same-sex marriage was already precluded by
law, so the constitutional amendments were unnecessary.7 Such
an argument assumed that: (1) the amendment did not add
anything to the existing law, and (2) existing same-sex marriage
bans would neither be repealed by the legislature nor struck down
on state constitutional grounds by the courts.8
Yet, in some states, these assumptions were not warranted
because the text of the amendment was broader than existing
law.9 Indeed, ironically, some courts pointed to existing statutes
that precluded same-sex marriage as a reason to interpret the
marriage amendment more broadly, arguing that any other
interpretation would make the amendment superfluous.10
7. See e.g., Leave It at the Altar, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, October 16,
2005, at E2, available at 2005 WLNR 16742877.
The very first sentence of the Texas Legislative Council's background
information on Proposition 2 states why this constitutional amendment is
unnecessary: "Current state law prohibits the issuance of a marriage
license for the marriage of persons of the same sex."
The Legislature passed the Defense of Marriage Act in 2003. Voters
should not ignore the redundancy of this proposed amendment, although
many of its supporters do.
Id: see also Gav Marriage Ban on Table for Today, TOPEKA CAP. J., May 3,
2004, at A, available at WLNR 11334945 ("A common theme among opponents
is that the constitutional amendment is unnecessary, as gay marriage is illegal
in Kansas under a state statute.").
8. Cf. Wood v. Comm'r. ex rel. Grayson, 2005 WL 1258921, at *1 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
May 26, 2005), rev'd, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2006).
The Attorney General states that the amendment was proposed to the
electorate because of fear from social and religious conservatives that the
Kentucky Constitution might someday be liberally construed by an activist
court so as to establish a state constitutional right of same-sex couples to
marry or that civil unions between same-sex couples might be mandated.
Id.
9. See Citizens for Equal Prot., 368 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (noting the "expansive
reading' given to the Nebraska amendment, which went far beyond merely
refusing to recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions), rev'd, 455 F.3d 859 (8th
Cir. 2006).
10. See City of Cleveland v. Voies, 2005 WL 1940135, at *4 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Mar.
23, 2005), rev'd, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio App. Feb. 23, 2006).
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In other states, the statute precluding same-sex marriage
might well have been struck down on state constitutional grounds.
Consider, for example, the context in which Hawaii's marriage
amendment was adopted. The Hawaii Supreme Court had
recently held that the state's same-sex marriage ban required
strict-scrutiny examination." Without the adoption of the
amendment, the Hawaii Supreme Court probably would not have
upheld the constitutionality of the same-sex marriage ban 12
because strict scrutiny imposes an extremely heavy burden on the
government.13 Therefore, it is at least plausible to argue that
In the matter before this court, there are several factors to suggest that
the Amendment is not just about eliminating gay marriage. First, this
Amendment is superfluous since Governor Taft signed House Bill 272
(Defense of Marriage Act aka DOMA), which was enacted February 6,
2004 and already nullifies the concept of gay marriage. Under this Act,
homosexuals are not allowed to marry and their relationships are not
recognized as marriages by the state.
Id.
11. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), superseded by
constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1998).
Accordingly, we hold that sex is a "suspect category" for purposes of equal
protection analysis under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution
(footnote omitted) and that HRS § 572-1 is subject to the "strict scrutiny"
test. It therefore follows, and we so hold, that (1) HRS § 572-1 is presumed
to be unconstitutional (2) unless Lewin, as an agent of the State of Hawaii,
can show that (a) the statute's sex-based classification is justified by
compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgements of the applicant couples' constitutional rights.
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
12. Cf. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (finding
that the statute was not constitutional). However, the constitutional amendment
was passed in 1998 before the Hawaii Supreme Court made clear in 1999 that both
sex and sexual orientation are suspect classes under the Hawaii Constitution.
Baehr v. Miike, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6 n.1 (Haw. Dec. 11, 1999).
[A]ssuming arguendo that Justice Ramil is correct that the touchstone of
the statute is sexual orientation, rather than sex, it would still have been
necessary, prior to the ratification of the marriage amendment, to subject
HRS § 572-1 to strict scrutiny in order to assess its constitutionality for
purposes of the equal protection clause of article I, section 5 of the Hawaii
Constitution. This is so because the framers of the 1978 Hawaii
Constitution, sitting as a committee of the whole, expressly declared their
intention that a proscription against discrimination based on sexual
orientation be subsumed within the clause's prohibition against
discrimination based on sex.
Id.
13. State v. Mallan, 950 P.2d 178, 227 (Haw. 1998) (citing McCloskey v.
Honolulu Police Dept., 799 P.2d 953, 957 (Haw. 1990)).
The strict scrutiny standard of review means that the government action
is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the government
must carry a heavy burden of justification, that the government must
demonstrate that its program has been structured with precision and is
tailored narrowly to serve legitimate objectives[,J and that it has selected
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Hawaii would have recognized same-sex marriages but for the
constitutional amendment.
When Alaska adopted its constitutional amendment, a lower
court had already held that the state's same-sex marriage ban
required a strict-scrutiny examination. 14  While the Alaska
Supreme Court has sometimes been supportive of rights for same-
sex couples-recently holding that the state's refusal to accord
certain employee benefits to same-sex partners of state employees
was unconstitutional 15 -it is difficult to speculate with certainty
that the court would have held that the state constitution
protected a right for same-sex partners to wed.
Suppose that the high courts of Alaska and Hawaii would
indeed have held that their respective state constitutions
protected the right to marry someone of the same sex. In that
event, the adoption of those constitutional amendments imposed a
heavy burden on same-sex couples, since those couples would
thereby have been denied all of the symbolic and tangible benefits
that otherwise could have been accrued through marriage.
Contrast the above hypothetical (in which the state
constitutions have been held to protect same-sex marriage) with a
hypothetical in which the constitution of Mississippi (Missippi
chosen at random) would never have been held to protect same-sex
marriage and that the state legislature would never have enacted
legislation permitting same-sex couples to marry. As a practical
matter, it might be that Mississippi's having enshrined the
prohibition within the state constitution would not have imposed
as much of an opportunity cost as would have been imposed by a
similar amendment in Alaska or Hawaii.16 Thus, ex hypothesi,
because same-sex marriage would have been recognized in Hawaii
or Alaska but for the amendments to those state constitutions, but
the least drastic means for effectuating its objectives.
Id.
14. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Ala. Sup.
Feb. 27, 1998), superseded by constitutional amendment as recognized in, Anderson
v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) ('The court, having found the decision
to choose one's life partner to be a fundamental right, has concluded that the strict
scrutiny test applicable to fundamental rights applies to its review of the State's
prohibition of same-sex marriages.").
15. See Ala. Civil Liberties Union v. Municipality of Anchorage, 122 P.3d 781
(Ala. 2005).
16. This point is assuming that the Federal Constitution will not be found to
protect the right to marry a same-sex partner. For some of the bases upon which a
court might find that the United States Constitution does protect the right to
marry a same-sex partner, see infra notes 216-80 and accompanying text.
20071
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would not have been recognized in Mississippi whether or not that
refusal was incorporated with the state constitution, 17 the
opportunity costs imposed by the adoption of marriage
amendments in Hawaii and Alaska might be thought to be much
greater than those imposed by the adoption of the constitutional
amendment in Mississippi.
Of course, the opportunity-cost analysis should not end there.
The Hawaii amendment removes constitutional protection for
same-sex marriage but does not incorporate a ban within the state
constitution' 8 -the Hawaii Legislature has the power to recognize
same-sex marriage, and it is not inconceivable that it might decide
to do so. 19 In contrast, in both Alaska and Mississippi, the
amendments not only removed possible state constitutional
protections for same-sex marriage but precluded the legislatures
from recognizing such unions. 20 Basically, in both Alaska and
Mississippi, but not in Hawaii, the state constitution will have to
be amended if same-sex marriages are to be recognized in those
states.21
C. Varying Breadths of the Amendments
The amendments to the constitutions of Mississippi, Hawaii
and Alaska, like the amendments to some other state
17. For e×xmple, it would be unlikely that the refusal to permit same-sex
couples to marry could be successfully challenged as an equal protection violation
under the Mississippi Constitution, since that constitution does not incorporate
equal protection guarantees as such. See Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie,
Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional
Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 329 (1986) (concluding "the
Mississippi Constitution contains no equality of treatment or equal protection
guarantees like those found in other state constitutions and in the fourteenth
amendment"); see also Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1018 n.26 (2003) ("Only in Delaware
and Mississippi have the courts failed to find that their constitutions contain a
provision guaranteeing equality.").
18. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998), supra note 2.
19. Cf. Jill Duman and Pam Smith, Gov's Signature Wouldn't End Marriage
Fight, 129 THE RECORDER-SF, September 8, 2005, at 1 ("AB 849 - the third attempt
by Assemblyman Mark Leno, D-San Francisco, to pass a bill legalizing gay
marriage - is the first such bill to be initiated and passed by a state legislature,
supporters say.").
20. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (1998); MISS. CONST. § 263-A (2004), supra note
3.
21. This assumes that same-sex marriage bans will not be found to violate
federal constitutional guarantees. For a discussion of some of the bases upon
which such bans might be found unconstitutional, see infra notes 216-78 and
accompanying text.
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constitutions, 22 preclude recognition of same-sex marriages but do
not facially ban the recognition of other same-sex relationships,
e.g., civil unions 23 or domestic partnerships. 24 However, other
states' amendments do preclude the recognition of same-sex
marriage and any other kind of relationship that approximates
marriage. 25 Finally, some amendments fail to recognize same-sex
marriages, other marriage-like relationships, and do not allow the
extension of benefits or incidents of marriage to unmarried
individuals or couples. 26
An amendment prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying
does not necessarily preclude same-sex couples from receiving a
variety of important benefits. For example, Vermont is careful to
articulate that civil unions are not marriages, 27 even though
individuals in civil unions have all of the rights and obligations of
spouses. 28 Even if Vermont were to incorporate a constitutional
provision specifying that civil unions were not marriages and that
marriage was reserved for different-sex couples, the state could
still recognize civil unions, thereby affording to same-sex couples a
number of tangible benefits.29 By the same token, Oregon, which
has an amendment reserving marriage for different-sex couples,
might still come to recognize civil unions. 30
22. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
23. 205 Conn. Acts 16 (2005).
Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law, whether derived from the general statutes,
administrative regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other
source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage, which is
defined as the union of one man and one woman.
Id.; Vt. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2005) ("Parties to a civil union shall have all
the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive
from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source
of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.").
24. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (2004) (detailing qualifications of domestic
partnership).
25. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
27. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(4) (2005) ("Marriage means the legally
recognized union of one man and one woman.").
28. Id. at § 1201(2) ("Civil union means that two eligible persons have
established a relationship pursuant to this chapter, and may receive the benefits
and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of spouses.").
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
30. Cf. Gay Rights Groups Target Speaker of Oregon House, REC. N. N.J., Oct.
27, 2005, at A22, available at 2005 WLNR 17448351 ("Over the summer, the
Republican [House Speaker] enraged gay rights supporters when she refused to let
the House vote on a civil unions bill that had been passed by the state Senate with
the blessing of the Democratic governor.").
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Even if a state constitution precludes the recognition of civil
unions, that would not preclude the state from according specific
benefits to same-sex couples. 31 It can hardly be said, for example,
that a state extending health insurance benefits to the domestic
partner of a state employee amounts to the state according that
couple the full benefits of marriage. 32 Thus, because civil unions
include all of the rights and obligations of marriage,3 3 a state
being constitutionally precluded from recognizing civil unions
would not similarly preclude the state from according particular
benefits to unmarried individuals or couples. 34 Similarly, an
amendment specifying that relationships substantially similar to
marriage cannot be recognized would not thereby preclude
awarding a few benefits to non-marital couples. This is because a
relationship accorded a few benefits can hardly be thought of as
substantially similar to marriage.
D. Amendments Regulating the "Incidents of Marriage"
The amendments specifying that the rights or incidents of
marriage cannot be accorded to unmarried individuals 35 appear to
have the broadest reach. 36  Nonetheless, the breadth of these
amendments greatly depends upon how they are interpreted, since
it is unclear which specific benefits are addressed when one
discusses the benefits or incidents of marriage, or even the rights
or obligations that "flow" from marriage.37
31. See Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 27, 2005) (holding that the Michigan constitutional amendment did not
preclude employers from awarding domestic partner benefits to individuals in
same-sex relationships).
32. Cf. id., at *4.
Health care benefits are not among the statutory rights or benefits of
marriage. An individual does not receive health care benefits for his or her
spouse as a matter of legal right upon getting married. If a spouse receives
health care benefits, it is as a result of a contractual provision or policy
directive of the employer. Likewise, health care benefits are not limited to
those who are married. Within the confines of what the health insurance
provider offers, an employer may choose to offer coverage to any person
who bears an employer-defined relationship to the employee. Health care
benefits for a spouse are benefits of employment, not benefits of marriage.
Id.
33. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
34. Id.
35. But see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (comparing the Nebraska
and Louisiana marriage amendments).
36. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
37. Barbara J. Cox, Using an "Incidents of Marriage" Analysis When
Considering Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil Unions,
[Vol. 25:59
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1. The Meaning of "Incidents of Marriage" May Change
Over Time
On one interpretation, the incidents or benefits of marriage
are those that are exclusively reserved for married couples, and
thus, a benefit accorded both to married and unmarried
individuals cannot be classified as an "incident of marriage."38
Because the benefits exclusively reserved for married couples
change over time,3 9 however, what might qualify as an "incident of
marriage" in 1960 might not qualify as an "incident of marriage"
in 1990. It is thus important to know whether an amendment
precluding unmarried individuals from being awarded any of the
incidents of marriage includes a date, either implicitly or
explicitly.
It would have been easy for the drafters to have included
language in the amendment itself specifying that the "incidents of
marriage" refer to those benefits exclusively reserved for married
couples at the time of the amendment's adoption. Their failure to
do so may indicate that they did not intend to define the "incidents
of marriage" in reference to a particular date, but rather to reflect
the practices in effect at the time the issue concerning the
"incidents of marriage" is litigated. Thus, in the year 2006 a
particular benefit would be considered an incident of marriage
solely reserved for married individuals, but in the year 2010 that
same benefit would no longer be considered an incident of
marriage because the legislature in 2008 had passed a law
extending that benefit to unmarried individuals as well.
On this understanding of the amendment, the term
"incidents of marriage" refers to the benefits the legislature has
exclusively reserved for married couples. Any benefit the
legislature awards to both married and unmarried individuals is
not an incident of marriage because it is not exclusively received
by married individuals. 40
And Domestic Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699, 718-19 (2004) ("Incidents of
marriage refer to each of the specific benefits, rights, or responsibilities flowing to a
married couple based on their marital status.").
38. Gerard V. Bradley, Law and the Culture of Marriage, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 189, 214 (2004) (describing the incidents of marriage as the
"benefits, duties, privileges of the married state").
39. Cf. Cox, supra note 37, at 707-08 (arguing that states will have to redefine
the benefits of marriage so they apply to civil unions).
40. Bradley, supra note 38, at 215.
Nothing is an incident of marriage unless extant state law makes it so.
There are no "state-less" incidents of marriage. 'Marital incidents" are not
goods floating free of the positive law. They do not form a brooding
20071
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If this is the correct interpretation, then a marriage
amendment reserving the "incidents of marriage" for married
couples serves as a check on the courts. In a state with such an
amendment, the courts cannot hold that the state constitution
requires non-marital couples to be eligible for benefits normally
reserved for married couples, because the state constitution would
itself immunize from state constitutional attack 41 the state's
reserving particular benefits for married couples.
Yet, the legislature has the power to extend a particular
benefit to non-marital couples, thereby (1) removing that benefit
from the category of "incidents of marriage," and (2) making a
decision by the legislature to accord that benefit to some, but not
other, unmarried individuals subject to constitutional analysis.
Thus, the amendment operates to quell the court's ability to say
that the equal protection guarantees of the state constitution
require that non-marital couples be accorded incidents of
marriage, 42 but the amendment does not inhibit them from saying
that the equal protection guarantees of the state constitution
prohibit the state from awarding certain benefits to some, but not
other, unmarried individuals.
When offering his take on Louisiana's marriage amendment,
Chief Justice Calogero noted that nothing "would prohibit an
unmarried couple from contracting to be co-owners of property,
from designating each other agents authorized to make critical
end of life decisions, or from leaving property to each other
through wills." 4 3  He suggested that the amendment "does not
omnipresence in the sky. State law makes this or that benefit a marital
incident by, and only by, saying that it is .... A legislature which wants to
give unmarried people some benefit previously reserved to the married
(something hitherto an "incident of marriage") may do so under the FMA.
Legislators so inclined would have to identify the benefit, and then define
the beneficiary class without using terms such as "marriage" and "spouse."
These lawmakers accomplish two things: they abolish an "incident of
marriage," and they pass a new law, or social welfare measure, or rule of
evidence, or tax provision. These two things may happen at once and are
intended to be in tandem.
Id.
41. See Ala. Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781 (Ala. 2005) (holding
that a public employer's spousal limitations violate Alaska's equal protection
clause). But cf. Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So.2d 715, 734 (La.
2005) (explaining that the Senate Committee on Judiciary had received testimony
"that noted a potential 'threat under Louisiana Constitution Article 1, sec 2, our
due process clause,' exists, which place[s] our traditional marriage statutes at
risk.").
42. See infra notes 253-55 and accompanying text (noting some of the possible
implications of this immunization).
43. McKeithen, 893 So.2d at 737 (Calogero, C.J., concurring).
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disturb or impair the fundamental contract and property rights
possessed by all individuals, be they homosexual or heterosexual,
married or unmarried."44 Ironically, the Louisiana amendment-
when so construed-is narrower than the Nebraska amendment,
45
even though the Louisiana amendment expressly precludes
conferring the "incidents of marriage" on unmarried individuals,
46
and the Nebraska amendment does not even refer to the "incidents
of marriage." 47
2. Broader Interpretations of the "Incidents of Marriage"
Language
A different interpretation of the "incidents of marriage" is
much more encompassing than the one described above.
48 It
might be argued that whatever benefits accrue by virtue of getting
or being married is an "incident of marriage." This means that
any benefit one receives by virtue of marrying, however mundane,
will not be accorded to unmarried individuals. For example,
suppose that John and June are members of a state-run health
club. They live in separate residences, each paying $400 in dues
annually. Suppose that they marry and can now continue their
memberships by each paying $250 annually. Arguably, their
ability to pay less in annual dues is a benefit of their marriage,
which the club cannot offer to unmarried individuals who are
living in the same household because that would involve extending
a marital benefit to unmarried individuals. Under this
interpretation, any benefit accorded to an individual by virtue of
his or her marrying cannot be accorded to an unmarried
individual.
Consider a widower who, by virtue of having been married to
44. Id.
45. For a discussion of the Nebraska amendment, see infra notes 213-31 and
accompanying text.
46. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (2004).
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one
man and one woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall
construe this constitution or any state law to require that marriage or the
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a union other
than the union of one man and one woman.
Id.
47. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (1999) ("Only marriage between a man and a
woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the
same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex
relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.").
48. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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the deceased, has the right to inherit when his spouse dies
intestate. 49 A marriage amendment might be thought to preclude
a legislature from passing a statute permitting a longtime non-
marital partner to be among those inheriting when an individual
dies intestate, because that would extend an incident of marriage
to a non-marital partner. Yet, it might also be interpreted to
mean that no one other than an individual's former spouse is
permitted to inherit when an individual dies intestate, 50 not even
other family members.
Another interpretation of the "incidents" language suggests
that there are certain benefits that are traditionally viewed as
marital benefits, 51 and that a marriage amendment prohibiting
the extension of such benefits to unmarried individuals prevents
the state from according any of these benefits to an unmarried
individual or couple. 52  According to this interpretation, the
legislature has the ability to say that some benefits reserved for
49. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (specifying who will inherit when
an individual dies intestate).
50. Id. Ohio law specifies who may inherit when an individual dies intestate.
When a person dies intestate having title or right to any personal
property, or to any real estate or inheritance, in this state, the personal
property shall be distributed, and the real estate or inheritance shall
descend and pass in parcenary, except as otherwise provided by law, in the
following course:
(A) If there is no surviving spouse, to the children of the intestate or their
lineal descendants, per stirpes;
(B) If there is a spouse and one or more children of the decedent or their
lineal descendants surviving, and all of the decedent's children who
survive or have lineal descendants surviving also are children of the
surviving spouse, then the whole to the surviving spouse;
(C) If there is a spouse and one child of the decedent or the child's lineal
descendants surviving and the surviving spouse is not the natural or
adoptive parent of the decedent's child, the first twenty thousand dollars
plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate to the spouse and the
remainder to the child or the child's lineal descendants, per stirpes;
(D) If there is a spouse and more than one child or their lineal descendants
surviving, the first sixty thousand dollars if the spouse is the natural or
adoptive parent of one, but not all, of the children, or the first twenty
thousand dollars if the spouse is the natural or adoptive parent of none of
the children, plus one-third of the balance of the intestate estate to the
spouse and the remainder to the children equally, or to the lineal
descendants of any deceased child, per stirpes.
Id.
51. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the
Risks to Federalism in Family Law, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 152 (2004)
(discussing "marital benefits-such as preference in custody and adoption, marital
testimonial privilege, property interests, claims for support, etc.").
52. See State v. McIntosh, 2005 WL 1940099, at *3 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 18,
2005) (explaining that a statute defining both spouses and people living as spouses
as family members does not violate Definition of Marriage Amendment).
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married individuals may be extended to unmarried individuals.
For example, a state legislature could make insurance benefits
available to non-marital partners 53 while continuing to restrict the
right to elect against a will.54
3. Parental Rights at Risk?
One difficulty with the position that only some rights can be
extended to unmarried individuals is that it is simply unclear
which benefits meet this criterion. Courts interpreting the same
text might come up with very different conclusions regarding
whether a particular benefit qualifies as an "incident of marriage"
and thus should not be accorded to someone who is not married.55
Consider, for example, the following discussion of the Ohio
marriage amendment:
Legal rights and obligations exclusive to marriage like
parental rights, medical benefits, and support obligations have
traditionally belonged to married couples exclusively.
Therefore, if the state of Ohio recognized or created a legal
status for unmarried couples that gave them parental rights,
medical benefits, support obligations, or any other legal right
or obligation traditionally granted exclusively to married
couples, a serious question as to the constitutionality of such
grants under Art. XV, § 11 would arise.56
Suppose that the Ohio amendment does not refer to the
"incidents of marriage" or to those rights and obligations which
have traditionally belonged to married couples exclusively and,
thus, that this interpretation of the amendment has no basis in
the text.57 Is it accurate to say that parental rights, medical
benefits, and support obligations have traditionally belonged to
married couples exclusively?
Parental rights and obligations as well as child support
obligations have long been recognized outside of marital status.5 8
The paradigmatic paternity suit often involves a woman claiming
53. Cf. Nat'l Pride at Work v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept.
27, 2005) (suggesting that partner health care benefits were not an incident of
marriage).
54. Cf. Matter of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that
the domestic partner of the deceased did not have a right to elect against his will).
55. Cf. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (D. Neb.
2005) (noting that incidents of marriage vary).
56. See McIntosh, at *3.
57. See infra notes 94-145 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ohio
amendments.
58. See infra notes 185-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of support
obligations to a non-marital partner.
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that an unmarried man fathered a child.59 While parenthood is
often believed to be an incident of marriage, it is often a trait of
unmarried individuals as well. Thus, parenthood-and even more
limited parenting privileges-cannot be considered an incident of
marriage.
Historically, the only person who could adopt a marital
partner's child, without the marital partner being required to
surrender his or her own rights, was a stepparent.60  Thus,
suppose that a widower with children remarries, and his new wife
wishes to adopt his children. She can do so, assuming that (1) the
adoption will promote the best interests of the children and (2) the
children's father approves of his wife's adopting them. 61 However,
if the couple was not married, he would have to surrender his own
parental rights in order for her to be able to adopt the children.
62
A state law requiring an individual to surrender his parental
rights before his long-term partner could adopt his children would
seem ludicrous on its face. After all, the two adults will be raising
the children together. Furthermore, the stability and security of
both the children and the adults is promoted when the
relationships between the children and each parent are legally
recognized.63
59. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a paternity suit
or action as a "court action to determine whether a person is the father of a child
born out of wedlock for the purpose, commonly, of enforcing support obligations").
60. Mark Strasser, Marriage, Parental Rights, and Public Policy: On the FMA,
Its Purported Justification, and Its Likely Effects on Families, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
118, 128 (2004).
Traditionally, whenever a child was adopted, the parental rights of the
biological parents were terminated. That may have made sense when the
child was going into a new family. However, when the child is going to
remain with her parent, it obviously would not make sense to require that
the biological parent surrender her parental rights so that the parent's
new spouse could be legally recognized as the child's (other) parent.
Through either statute or case law, states recognized the absurdity of such
a result and created an exception to the general rule that the biological
parents' rights would have to be terminated before an adoption could take
place. By making this exception, states made it possible for stepparents to
adopt without their spouses having to surrender their parental rights.
Id.
61. See Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On
Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66
TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (1999) ("Courts will not allow the adoption by the
stepparent unless the adoption promotes the child's best interests and the
biological parent consents.").
62. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
63. Cf. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass. 1993) (noting "the
emotional security and current practical ramifications which legal recognition of
the reality of her parental relationships [with the two adults raising her] will
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The state law described above6 4 is easier to understand after
a little background is offered. At one time, a typical adoption
involved placing a child with new parents where that child would
cease to have any connection to her biological parents. The
biological parents surrendered their parental rights so that the
child was part of a new nuclear family.65 On some level, 66 it makes
sense to require biological parents to surrender their parental
rights-if only to clarify who has the ultimate decision-making
authority.67  The situation involving a stepparent adopting a
spouse's child was viewed as an exception,68 and there was some
reluctance in extending it to situations in which the would-be
adoptive parent was a cohabiting non-marital partner of a
parent.69
Yet, even before the marriage amendments were adopted,
some states were already permitting non-marital partners to
adopt their partner's children without forcing the latter parent to
surrender his or her parental rights.70 Thus, even if June was
provide Tammy").
64. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
65. Strasser, supra note 61, at 1020-21.
In what many believe to be the paradigmatic adoption, the child is placed
in a new family that has no connection to the child's biological family.
When the adoption is finalized, all legal ties to the biological family are
severed and the child is treated as the biological child of the adoptive
parents.
Id.
66. A separate issue is whether a state should permit open adoptions where the
biological parent continues to have contact with the child. See generally Margaret
M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and Enforceability of
Visitation Orders for Former Parents under Uniform Adoption Act § 4-113, 51 FLA.
L. REV. 89 (1999).
67. See Strasser, supra note 61, at 1020-21 ("Allowing the biological parent to
retain rights would create potential conflicts and power struggles.").
68. That view does not reflect the current reality. See Note, Joint Adoption: A
Queer Option?, 15 VT. L. REV. 197, 201 (1990) ("Stepparent adoption has become
the most frequent type of adoption in the United States.").
69. See In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999) (holding that
same-sex cohabitant of legal mother does not meet statutory adoption
requirements); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (holding that
adoption by mother's female cohabitant was prohibited by Wisconsin statute); In re
Adoption of T.K.J. and K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
children of lesbian couple did not have property interest in care from potential
adoptive mothers).
70. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (permitting two
women in a committed relationship each to have parental rights to the same child);
Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (same); In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (recognizing second parent adoption for both same-sex and
different sex couples).
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cohabiting with-but not married to-widower John, she might be
allowed to adopt his children without John being forced to
surrender parental rights.
Most states permit single individuals to adopt. 71 Given that
parent-child relationships can be established outside of the
marriage context, it is not at all clear that custody and adoption
are interests that qualify as "incidents of marriage."
Just as times have changed with respect to whether
unmarried individuals can adopt, they also have with respect to
who may be covered under insurance plans. For example, a large
number of Fortune 500 companies now extend benefits to non-
marital partners. 72 This willingness to award insurance benefits
beyond the traditional family is of fairly recent vintage,73 further
underscoring the importance of determining whether those
supporting the marriage amendments are seeking to return to a
bygone era, are seeking to limit which benefits currently reserved
for married individuals might be extended by the courts to
unmarried individuals, or have other purposes in mind. Some
individuals who support a marriage amendment which contains
"incidents of marriage" language might have particular benefits in
mind, whereas other supporters might merely wish to prevent the
extension of benefits currently exclusively reserved for married
individuals to unmarried individuals. The difference between
these two positions is potentially quite large, and courts
attempting to interpret their amendments and their respective
constitutions would be helped greatly were they to know what was
intended.
The interpretation of amendments that contain "incidents of
marriage" language will keep the courts busy for the foreseeable
future.74  It is important to note that voters who approved
marriage amendments "protecting" the "incidents of marriage" did
71. See Mark Strasser, Adoption, Best Interests, and the Constitution: On
Rational Basis Scrutiny and the Avoidance of Absurd Results, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD.
297, 298 (2003) ("As a general matter, singles can adopt.").
72. See Rene6 M. Scire & Christopher A. Raimondi, Employment Benefits: Will
Your Significant Other Be Covered?, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 374 (2000)
("there is a large number of Fortune 500 Companies which have joined the trend of
extending employment benefits to domestic partners").
73. Erin Stefanec, Mimicking Marriage: As the Evolution of the Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Progresses, Civil Unions Currently Represent the
Best Alternative to Marriage, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 119, 133 (2004) ("In 1982, the
first domestic partnership was created by a private entity, the Village Voice
newspaper.").
74. See supra notes 35-73 and accompanying text.
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so without knowing which benefits would be affected. When they
cast their votes, the amendments did not include enough
information for anyone to know which benefits would be affected.
Some of those supporting these amendments might have been
voting to preclude same-sex couples from having access to benefits
to which these voters believed same-sex couples should have
access. 75 Further, not only did some voters not appreciate which
benefits were at issue, but it also seems clear that many voted for
the marriage amendments without considering or understanding
who would be affected by these amendments.
E. The Surprisingly Broad Reach of Some Amendments
All of the amendments target same-sex couples in that all
preclude the recognition of same-sex marriages in particular or
same-sex relationships in general. That said, some amendments
are written more broadly than others, and are more likely to affect
a whole range of individuals-including different-sex couples and
their children. For example, most of the state marriage
amendments precluding the recognition of marriage-like
relationships do not differentiate between same-sex and different-
sex relationships. 76 This means that whatever limitations are
placed on the recognition of non-marital relationships apply with
equal force regardless of whether those relationships involve
same-sex or different-sex individuals.
This point about the breadth of application of the various
amendments is not merely of theoretical interest for at least two
distinct reasons. First, both same-sex and different-sex couples
can become domestic partners under California's statute. 77 By the
75. See Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws
Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195, 2209 (2005) ("Interestingly, polls have shown
that while a substantial majority of the public rejects the idea of same-sex
marriage, a narrow majority also believes that same-sex couples should receive
equal treatment with respect to economic rights.").
76. Nebraska only refuses to recognize quasi-marital status for same-sex
couples. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (1999) ("The uniting of two persons of the
same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex
relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.").
77. See CAL. FAMILY CODE § 297(b) (2004).
A domestic partnership shall be established in California when all of the
following requirements are met:
(6) Either of the following:
(A) Both persons are members of the same sex.
(B) One or both of the persons meet the eligibility criteria under Title
II of the Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 402(a) for
20071
Law and Inequality [Vol. 25:59
same token, Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiary status, while not as
robust as California's domestic partnership status and, thus,
perhaps not qualifying as quasi-marital, 78 permits both same-sex
and different-sex couples to register. 79 At least facially, those
constitutional amendments precluding the state from recognizing
quasi-marital relationships apply whether or not the members of
the couples are of the same sex.80 Domestic partners, whether of
old-age insurance benefits or Title XVI of the Social Security Act as
defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 1381 for aged individuals.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, persons of
opposite sexes may not constitute a domestic partnership unless one
or both of the persons are over the age of 62.
Id.
78. See HAW. STAT. § 572C-6 (2005).
Upon the issuance of a certificate of reciprocal beneficiary relationship, the
parties named in the certificate shall be entitled to those rights and
obligations provided by the law to reciprocal beneficiaries. Unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, reciprocal beneficiaries shall not
have the same rights and obligations under the law that are conferred
through marriage under chapter 572.
Id.; see also M. V. Lee Badgett, Predicting Partnership Rights: Applying the
European Experience to the United States, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71, 81 (2005).
Vermont, Connecticut, and California offer a civil union or domestic
partnership status to same-sex couples that comes with all (Vermont and
Connecticut) or almost all (California) of the state-granted rights and
responsibilities of marriage. Three other states offer more limited
packages of rights for same-sex couples who register with the state as
"reciprocal beneficiaries" (Hawaii) or domestic partners (New Jersey and
Maine).
Id.
79. See HAW. STAT. § 572C-2 (2005).
The legislature concurrently acknowledges that there are many
individuals who have significant personal, emotional, and economic
relationships with another individual yet are prohibited by such legal
restrictions from marrying. For example, two individuals who are related
to one another, such as a widowed mother and her unmarried son, or two
individuals who are of the same gender. Therefore, the legislature
believes that certain rights and benefits presently available only to
married couples should be made available to couples comprised of two
individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying one another.
Id.
80. Several Ohio courts have noted that the Ohio marriage amendment is not
limited to same-sex couples. See State v. Steineman, 2005 WL 1940104, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 26, 2005).
Therefore, by reading the plain language of the second sentence of this
Amendment it appears to this Court that there is no restriction based
upon gender in regard to the legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals. Therefore, this Amendment can apply to unmarried
individuals of the same gender, or unmarried individuals of the opposite
gender.
Id.; see also State v. Burk, 2005 WL 786212, at *3 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Mar. 23,
2005).
It may be argued that the intent of the second sentence was simply to
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the same sex or of different sexes, who move to or travel through a
state with such an amendment risk non-recognition of their
relationship.8 ' For example, were a couple in a traffic accident
while vacationing in a state with such a law, it might be important
to establish the relationship for purposes of medical
decisionmaking 2 or tort.8 3
Second, the fact that these amendments apply to same-sex
and different-sex relationships is also important for a somewhat
subtler reason-namely, it has induced courts to interpret their
state marriage amendment overbroadly in an attempt to
accommodate the apparent intention to impact both same- and
different-sex non-marital couples.8 4  Thus, some courts have
recognized the fact that their state constitutional amendment is
sex-neutral, but have failed to appreciate that some of the
marriage-like relationships are also open to different-sex couples.
These courts then reasoned that because the amendment was not
limited to same-sex couples, it must have been designed to do
more than preclude the recognition of marriage-like relationships.
For example, in State v. Steineman,8 5 an Ohio court noted that the
Ohio amendment "can apply to unmarried individuals of the same
gender, or unmarried individuals of the opposite gender."8 6
Because the amendment was not solely intended to prevent same-
sex couples from marrying or entering into civil unions, 8 7 the court
preclude recognition by the State of so-called "domestic partnerships" or
"civil unions" as a back-door means of sanctioning same-sex relationships.
However, by its explicit terms Art. XV, § 11, is not so limited, but clearly is
worded as broadly as possible, so as to encompass any quasi-marital
relationships-whether they be same-sex or opposite-sex.
Id.
81. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art 15, § 16(b) ("No relationship, other than a
marriage, shall be recognized by the state as entitling the parties to the rights or
incidents of marriage.").
82. The Nebraska amendment was interpreted as precluding inter alia giving
to a non-spouse the medical decision-making powers that a spouse would have. See
Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999-1000 (D. Neb.
2005).
83. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text for a discussion on Ohio law
respecting bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress.
84. A separate issue is whether that in fact was the intention, since it may be
that the amendments were worded this way to avoid facial orientation
discrimination. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
85. Steineman, 2005 WL 1940104.
86. Id. at *2.
87. See id. ("Had the framers of the Amendment chosen to specifically limit the
interpretation of the second sentence to the issue clearly identified in the first
sentence of this Amendment, this could have been done by limiting the definition of
unmarried individuals to those of the same gender.").
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concluded that the amendment precluded application of the
domestic violence statute to individuals who were cohabiting but
unmarried.8 8
The Steineman court was not alone in its holding. In fact,
courts throughout Ohio have heard the issue and are divided
about whether the amendment actually does preclude application
of the domestic violence statute in such contexts. Several courts
have concluded that the second sentence of the amendment8 9
precludes the state from extending to non-marital, cohabiting
partners the protections that would be extended to a spouse,90
while others have concluded that the amendment does not
preclude the extension of such benefits. 91
Some of the amendments precluding the recognition of quasi-
marital relationships are more clearly written than others. For
example, the Kentucky Constitution states that a "status identical
or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried
individuals shall not be valid or recognized,"92 and the North
88. Id. at *4. Cf. State v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (2005) (noting that the
amendment applied to both same-sex and different-sex couples by construing the
amendment broadly).
89. The second sentence of the amendment reads: "This state and its political
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effect of marriage." OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (2004).
90. See State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 1076 (Ohio App. 2006); City of Cleveland v.
Voies, 2005 WL 1940135 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 23, 2005), rev'd by City of Cleveland v.
Voies, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio App. Feb. 23, 2006); State v. Burk, 2005 WL 786212
(Ohio Ct. Com P1. Mar. 23, 2005), rev'd 843 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio App. 2005); State v.
Peterson, 2005 WL 1940114 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 18, 2005); State v. Dixon, 2005
WL 1940110 (Ohio Ct. Corn P1. Apr. 26, 2005); Steineman, 2005 WL 1940104.
91. See Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254; State v. Adams, 2005 WL 3196850 (Ohio App.
Nov. 28, 2005); City of Cleveland v. Knipp, 2005 WL 1017620 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 10,
2005); State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Misc. 2005); State v. McIntosh, 2005
WL 1940099 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 18, 2005); State v. Newell, 2005 WL 1364937
(Ohio App. May 31, 2005).
92. KY. CONST. § 233A (2004). While the Kentucky amendment seems clear on
its face, it may nonetheless be construed overbroadly. Cf. Wood v. Commonwealth
ex rel. Grayson, 2005 WL 1258921, at *3 (Ky. Cir. Ct. May 26, 2005).
[T]he Plaintiffs charge that the electorate was unable to discern from the
language of the amendment, the impact upon: (1) suits for wrongful death,
(2) intestate inheritance, (3) hospital visitation, (4) medical decisions, (5)
decision making capacity for burial and funeral arrangements, (6)
protection under Kentucky's domestic violence statutes for spouse abuse,
(7) the ability of businesses and local governments to provide health
insurance or bereavement leave to domestic partners, and (8) the legal
status of existing contractual agreements between unmarried individuals
such as durable powers of attorney, health surrogate designations,
designations of guardianship, and adoption agreements. This Court
agrees with the Plaintiffs' contention that the above enumerated relational
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Dakota Constitution specifies, "No other domestic union, however
denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same
or substantially equivalent legal effect.' '93  Some of the
amendments, however, are less clear. For example, the purpose
behind the Ohio and Michigan amendments is presumably to
preclude the recognition of quasi-marital status for same-sex and
different-sex couples. However, at least in part because neither of
the amendments was particularly well drafted, confident
predictions about how they will be authoritatively construed are
especially difficult to make.
1. Multiple Interpretations of the Ohio Amendment
Consider the Ohio amendment, which reads:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a
marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political
subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design,
qualities, significance or effect of marriage. 94
When interpreting this amendment, it might be helpful to
consider what some of the other state amendments say. Not only
do some states' amendments reserve marriage for different-sex
couples, but they make clear that no other status identical or
substantially similar to marriage will be recognized. Presumably,
such amendments intend to cover civil unions, which are identical
to marriage, 95 and domestic partnerships, which are substantially
similar but not identical to marriage.96
and legal rights and responsibilities may be affected by the passage of the
Marriage Amendment. This Court is not particularly persuaded by the
generalized response to these issues, as exemplified, "[t]he amendment
does not prohibit employers from giving domestic partner benefits, if that
is what they feel is in their best interest."
Id.; see Attorney General's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss
and Judgment on the Pleadings, pp. 3-4.
93. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (1998).
94. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
95. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2006) ("Parties to a civil union shall
have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether
they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any
other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.").
96. See William C. Duncan, Survey of Interstate Recognition of Quasi-Marital
Statuses, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 617, 630-31 (2005) (discussing the differences
between the statuses of marriage and [California] domestic partnership: (1)
domestic partners cannot file jointly on their income tax returns, (2) the laws
provide different entry and exit (before five years or children involved) procedures,
(3) domestic partnerships are not guaranteed interstate recognition, (4) the law
does not secure federal benefits for domestic partners, and (5) the law does not
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Ohio chose to constitutionally preclude recognition of same-
sex marriages, which are performed in Massachusetts, 97 as well as
those unions which "approximate" marriage, such as California's
domestic partnerships.98 Yet, if Ohio's usage of "approximate"
performs the same function as Kentucky's "substantially similar,"
then Ohio's amendment would not preclude the recognition of
Vermont civil unions, which are not merely intended to
approximate marriage, but to emulate it.99
When interpreting the amendment, Ohio courts have not
focused on the possible ambiguity created by Ohio's failure to
preclude recognition of unions that are intended to mirror
marriage. Rather, at least some have offered a reading which
seems to ignore the plain meaning of the statute, such as
suggesting that the statute precludes enforcement of the state's
domestic violence statute against non-marital cohabitants.
The Ohio amendment precludes recognition of any legal
status that "intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effect of marriage."100  Regrettably, many courts
have failed to appreciate this focus on the design, qualities,
significance, or effect of marriage, which presumably means the
sum total of the consequences of marriage.10 1 If it were said, for
secure access to benefits controlled specifically by state constitutional provisions).
97. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003)
(holding the Massachusetts Commonwealth may not deny civil marriage to same
sex couples).
98. See State v. McIntosh, 2005 WL 1940099, at *5 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 18,
2005), overruled by State v. McIntosh, 2006 WL 925179 (Ohio App. Apr. 7, 2006)
("California's Domestic Partners Act, enacted Mar. 22, 2005, is a clear example of
state legislation that creates a legal status that intends to approximate marriage
for unmarried individuals."); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (2005).
Domestic partners are given the following legal status under the Act:
"... domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and
benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and
duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative
regulations, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other
provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses.
Id.
99. But see State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872, 878 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 2005)
("The second sentence limits legislative authority to redefine marriage, with a term
like 'civil union,' to approximate a traditional, heterosexual marriage.").
100. See State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 1076, 1077 (Ohio App. 2006) (holding
domestic violence protections do not extend to "a person living as a spouse"); City of
Cleveland v. Voies, 2005 WL 1940135, at *12 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 23, 2005), rev'd by
2006 WL 440341 (Ohio App. Feb. 23, 2006); State v. Burk, 2005 WL 786212, at *8
(Ohio Ct. Coin. P1. Mar. 23, 2005) rev'd by 843 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio App. 2005) ("the
adoption of the Amendment makes charging unmarried cohabitants with domestic
violence a legal impossibility").
101. Ward, 849 N.E.2d at 1077; Voies, 2005 WL 1940135 at *12; Burk, 2005 WL
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example, that the effect of marriage is to give an individual the
legal power not to be forced to testify against her spouse, 10 2 then
other consequences, such as the right to elect against a will,103
would presumably not count as the effect of marriage. While both
can be an effect of marriage, both cannot be the effect of marriage.
By the same token, if it is thought that the significance of
marriage is that it allows one to inherit when one's spouse dies
intestate, 0 4 then it cannot also be thought that the significance of
marriage is that it allows one to consent to the withdrawal or
withholding of treatment where (1) there is no guardian and (2)
one's spouse is in a terminal condition and no longer able to make
informed decisions regarding her own medical care. 10 5 It simply
cannot be maintained that the design, quality, significance or
effect of marriage is to make one subject to a domestic violence
charge.
When considering whether the amendment precludes
applying the domestic violence statute in cases involving a non-
marital partner, some Ohio courts have sought to determine
whether that statute treats a non-marital partner as a spouse in a
particular respect, as if the amendment had precluded recognizing
a legal status that approximated the design, qualities, significance
or effect of marriage in any respect. 0 6 Indeed, one court suggested
786212 at *8. The amendment would also apply to a status which accorded almost
all of the benefits of marriage since that status would approximate, though not
mirror, marriage.
102. OHIo R. EVID. 601 (2005-06).
Every person is competent to be a witness except:
(B) A spouse testifying against the other spouse charged with a crime
except when either of the following applies:
(1) a crime against the testifying spouse or a child of either spouse is
charged;
(2) the testifying spouse elects to testify.
Id.
103. After the initial appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate,
the probate court shall issue a citation to the surviving spouse, if any is living at
the time of the issuance of the citation, to elect whether to exercise the surviving
spouse's rights under Chapter 2106 of the Revised Code, including, after the
probate of a will, the right to elect to take under the will or under section 2105.06
of the Revised Code. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2106.01 (2002).
104. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (2002) (specifying who will inherit
when an individual dies intestate).
105. See OHIO REV. CODE Ann. § 2133.08 (2002) (specifying who may consent to
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
106. There are at least two possible interpretations of the words in the second
sentence of the 2004 amendment. One, given by Judge Friedman, would hold that
the wording clearly invalidates any statute that touches on "marriage" or that for
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that the amendment precludes statutes' incorporation of the
phrase "as a spouse."'10 7 This analysis is incorrect for two distinct
reasons.
First, the amendment does not preclude treating an
unmarried person like a spouse in any respect, but instead,
precludes the states from recognizing a status that approximates
marriage. Second, if the amendment precluded the state from
treating an unmarried individual as a spouse in any respect, then
merely using a different term, e.g., lifelong romantic partner, or a
functional definition, 0 S does not avoid the amendment's
prohibition-the state is then according a benefit of marriage,
even if not using a term like "spouse," and, thus, falls afoul of the
amendment.
Some Ohio courts have suggested that the amendment
precludes permitting non-marital couples from enjoying certain
benefits traditionally associated with marriage. 109 For example,
one court suggested that the amendment prohibits two individuals
from changing their last names so that they might have the same
last name. 110  This analysis is also incorrect. Just as the
amendment does not preclude the state from treating an
unmarried person like a spouse in any respect, the amendment
does not preclude the state from treating an unmarried person like
a spouse in any particular respect, e.g., from enjoying benefits
traditionally associated with marriage."'
An additional reason to reject the "incidents of marriage"
interpretation of the Ohio amendment is that the Ohio Supreme
any purpose whatsoever, recognizes a relationship not strictly confined to one man
and one woman who are formally married. State v. Burk, 2005 WL 786212. Cf.
State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872, 879 (Ohio Ct. Com.P1. 2005).
107. See State v. Peterson, 2005 WL 1940114, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 18,
2005) ("If it is the intention of the legislature to cover individuals living together
who are not formally married, then language other than 'person living as a spouse'
needs to be crafted in order to cover that circumstance.").
108. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing how the term
"cohabitant" is defined).
109. If the state of Ohio recognized or created a legal status for unmarried
couples that gave them parental rights, medical benefits, support obligations, or
any other legal right or obligation traditionally granted exclusively to married
couples, a serious question as to the constitutionality of such grants under Art. XV,
§ 11 would arise. See State v. McIntosh 2005 WL 1940099, at *3 (Ohio Ct. Com.
P1. Apr. 18, 2005), rev'd 852 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 2006).
110. Id. at *6. ("Likewise, the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in In re
Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002), involved the grant of a right to an unmarried
couple that, arguably, approximated the effect of marriage.").
111. See supra notes 48-75 and accompanying text (discussing amendments
which preclude extension of the incidents of marriage to non-marital couples).
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Court had already interpreted the state law regarding name
changes fairly broadly. 112 Indeed, in a case in which two women
wanted to change their last names to a common last name, the
Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the appellants wanted "to
demonstrate their level of commitment to each other and to the
children that they planned to have."113  The court allowed the
name change because the appellants had no criminal or fraudulent
purposes.114
Some Ohio courts seem to have recognized that the
amendment is merely trying to prohibit relationships that
approximate marriage. For example, in State v. McIntosh, an
Ohio court recognized that the "issue is whether the legal status
recognized or created by the statute approximates marriage, not
whether the factual relationship of the covered persons
approximates marriage." 1 5 However, that same court suggested
that if the legislature awarded any "legal right or obligation
traditionally granted exclusively to married couples, a serious
question as to the constitutionality of such grants under Art. XV, §
11 would arise." 116 Yet, the legislature could award one of the
legal rights traditionally associated with marriage without
creating a status that even remotely approximated marriage.1 1 7
Some courts have suggested that the Ohio amendment
constitutionally inhibits the state from recognizing common-law
112. See In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002) (holding lack of criminal or
fraudulent purpose means name change applications are reasonable and proper).
113. Id. at 849.
114. Id.
It is clear that appellants have no criminal or fraudulent purpose for
wanting to change their names. They are not attempting to evade
creditors or to create the appearance of a state-sanctioned marriage.
Accordingly, we hold that appellants' name change applications are
reasonable and proper under R.C. 2717.01(A) and, therefore, reverse the
judgment of the court of appeals.
Id.
115. McIntosh, 2005 WL 1940099, at *2.
116. Id. at *3.
117. See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretive
Framework for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U. L.
REV. 221, 233-34 (2004).
The Ohio text clearly bars the creation of any new legal status patterned
after marriage, including not only civil unions but also domestic
partnerships and other marriage-like relationships. It says nothing,
however, with respect to specific benefits, ostensibly allowing the
legislature to allocate benefits on the basis of household or other relevant
characteristics.
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marriage. 118 This is incorrect for a few reasons. The first sentence
of the amendment does not probibit the recognition of common-law
marriage-assuming that the individuals are not of the same
sex.119 Furthermore, the amendment's second sentence also does
not preclude common-law marriage because common-law marriage
is neither an approximation of marriage1 20 nor a separate status
that mirrors marriage. Rather, common-law marriage describes a
different way by which one might become married. Whether one
has a common-law marriage or a ceremonial marriage,1 21 the
rights and responsibilities are the same, and the only way to
dissolve the union is through legal proceedings or the death of one
of the parties. 122
Ohio no longer permits the creation of common-law
marriages in the state.1 23 However, the state will recognize a
common-law marriage if it came into being within the state before
October 10, 1991, or was created after that date in a state
118. See City of Cleveland v. Voies, 2005 WL 1940135, at *6 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Mar.
23, 2005), rev'd 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio App. Feb. 23, 2006) ("As presently worded,
the Amendment would also refuse to recognize common law marriages.").
119. Cf. De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. 1984) (holding that two
individuals of the game sex could not establish a common-law marriage).
120. See Sulfridge v. Kindle, 2005 WL 1806482, at *2 (Ohio App. July 28,
2005) (discussing the elements of a common-law marriage which are "(1) an
agreement of marriage in praesenti; (2) cohabitation as husband and wife; and (3) a
holding out by the parties to those with whom they normally come into contact,
resulting in a reputation as a married couple in the community." (citing Nestor v.
Nestor, 472 N.E. 2d 1091, 1093 (1984))); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.08 (2002).
An ordained or licensed minister of any religious society or congregation
within this state who is licensed to solemnize marriages, a judge of a
county court in accordance with section 1907.18 of the Revised Code, a
judge of a municipal court in accordance with section 1901.14 of the
Revised Code, a probate judge in accordance with section 2101.27 of the
Revised Code, the mayor of a municipal corporation in any county in which
such municipal corporation wholly or partly lies, the superintendent of the
state school for the deaf, or any religious society in conformity with the
rules of its church, may join together as husband and wife any persons
who are not prohibited by law from being joined in marriage.
Id.
122. See Poland Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Swesey 2003 WL 22946148, at *7 (Ohio
App. Dec. 12, 2003) ("Common-law marriages can only be terminated through legal
proceedings.") (citing Lyon v. Lyon, 621 N.E.2d 718 (Ohio App. 1993). See also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.12(B)(2) (2002) ("Common law marriages that
occurred in this state prior to October 10, 1991, and that have not been terminated
by death, divorce, dissolution of marriage, or annulment remain valid on and after
[October 10, 1991].").
123. See Sulfridge, 2005 WL 1806482 at *2 ("Our analysis begins from the
premise that Ohio law prohibits the creation of common law marriages after
October 10, 1991. R.C. 3105.12(B)(1).").
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recognizing common-law marriages. 124 While the amendment
might have expressly stated that common-law marriages validly
celebrated elsewhere would still be recognized, 125 the point
nonetheless remains that neither of the sentences of the
amendment even speaks to common-law marriage.
Clearly, the Ohio courts do not wholly understand the
implications of interpreting the amendment broadly. Consider, for
example, the view that the Ohio amendment precludes treating an
unmarried individual "as a spouse." 126 Yet, this would seem to
enshrine within the constitution a provision authorizing
discrimination on the basis of marital status, existing laws to the
contrary notwithstanding. 27
Currently, there are a variety of laws designed to prevent
conflicts of interest,1 28 like precluding an individual from sitting on
a board if that board contracts with a business owned by a
member of the individual's family. 29 The amendment would seem
to preclude treating a longtime non-marital companion as a spouse
for these purposes, notwithstanding that the purpose behind such
conflict-of-interest laws would also be served were these same
safeguards in place so that an individual could not steer contracts
to a business owned by a longtime companion.
In cases involving bystander negligent infliction of emotional
distress, Ohio considers the following factors:
124. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.12 B(3)(a) ("They came into existence
prior to October 10, 1991, or come into existence on or after that date, in another
state or nation that recognizes the validity of common law marriages in accordance
with all relevant aspects of the law of that state or nation.").
125. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 83 (2004) ("Legal status for unmarried
persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be
valid or recognized in Arkansas, except that the legislature may recognize a
common law marriage from another state between a man and a woman.").
126. See State v. Peterson, 2005 WL 1940114, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 18,
2005) ("If it is the intention of the legislature to cover individuals living together
who are not formally married, then language other than 'person living as a spouse'
needs to be crafted in order to cover that circumstance.").
127. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.021(1)(a) (2002) (making it illegal to
discriminate against any applicant for credit on the basis of marital status).
128. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 340.02 (2002) (precluding an individual from
serving as a member of the board of alcohol, drug addiction and mental health
services if that individual has a family member contracting with the board for
goods or services); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1181.05 (2002) (precluding employees
(including the superintendent) of the division of financial institutions and their
family members from having an interest in any bank, savings and loan association,
savings bank credit union, or consumer finance company which is under the
supervision of the superintendent of financial institutions).
129. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 340.02.
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(1) how close the plaintiff was located to the scene of the
accident; and
(2) if any ensuing shock was the result of the plaintiff
observing the accident first hand as opposed to being informed
that the accident occurred; and
(3) whether or not the plaintiff was closely related to the
victim. 130
When discussing the third factor, the Supreme Court of Ohio
has clearly stated that "a strict blood relationship between the
accident victim and the plaintiff-bystander is not necessarily
required."'131 Elaborating on this point, the court suggested that "a
plaintiff who is affianced with the victim could very well be
described as a close relation,"'132 thereby making clear that an
individual who is neither a blood nor legal relation to the victim
could still satisfy the third criterion. 33  However, a broad
interpretation of the Ohio amendment might preclude a fianc6e or
a long-term, non-marital partner from meeting the third criterion.
In Ohio, divorce agreements may include a provision
stipulating that an ex-spouse will receive spousal support
payments only until that individual remarries or begins
cohabitating with someone else. 34 By permitting the termination
of spousal support in the event of remarriage or cohabitation, the
state removes the incentive for a support-receiving individual to
move in with a paramour instead of marrying him or her.
Ironically, a broad reading of the Ohio marriage amendment has
the potential to negate the enforcement of such a provision, and, in
effect, create a disincentive to marriage in certain circumstances.
When the Ohio Supreme Court defined cohabitation as
involving (1) the sharing of family and financial responsibilities,
130. Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766 (Ohio 1983) (citing Dillon v. Legg, 441
P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 767.
133. It should not be thought that by refusing to limit recovery to family
members Ohio therefore permits almost anyone to recover in an action involving
negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander. Cf. Smith v. Kings Entm't
Co., 649 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (Ohio App. 1994) (noting that the "record reveals that
Smith and Haithcoat were friends, that the two had known each other for
approximately one and one-half years, that they had never been romantically
involved, and that they had contact with each other, by telephone or otherwise,
quite frequently," and finding that the third criterion had not been met).
134. See, e.g., Kunkle v. Kunkle, 554 N.E.2d 83, 85 (Ohio 1990) ("Said payments
shall continue during the life of the payee, Nancy R. Kunkle, so long as she does not
remarry or cohabit with a person of the opposite sex for more than six (6) months
continuously with the happening of either of the latter subjecting said award to
modification by the Court.").
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and (2) consortium, 135 it did so in the context of explaining the
state's domestic violence statute. 3 6 The court noted that the
legislature "believed that an assault involving a family or
household member deserves further protection than an assault on
a stranger,"'137 in part because in "contrast to 'stranger' violence,
domestic violence arises out of the relationship between the
perpetrator and the victim."'138  Courts striking the domestic
violence statute in light of the state marriage amendment seemed
to believe that "the legislature intended to bestow upon unmarried
couples living together a status that paralleled marriage so those
unmarried individuals would be recognized under the ambit of
Ohio Revised Code Section 2919.25(A)."' 139  Yet, if such an
interpretation renders the domestic violence statute
unconstitutional, it also renders the enforcement of the
cohabitation clause in divorce agreements unconstitutional,
especially because the Williams factors used to determine
"cohabitation" for purposes of the domestic violence statute are the
same factors used to determine when the cohabitation clause in
divorce agreements is triggered. 140
The clear intent behind a divorce agreement provision that
permits cessation of spousal support upon successive cohabitation
135. See State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ohio 1997) ("[Ihe essential
elements of 'cohabitation' are (1) sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and
(2) consortium.").
136. Id. at 1127 (stating that the sole issue before the court was interpreting
statute R.C. 2919.25).
137. Id. at 1129.
138. Id. at 1128.
139. State v. Steineman, 2005 WL 1940104, *3 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Mar. 23,
2005). See also State v. Burk, 2005 WL 786212, *3 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 26,
2005) (noting that the cohabitation factors clearly exclude other arrangements
under which people may share living quarters: college roommates or mere friends
may share a house, or even a bedroom, but share none of the other attributes of
"cohabitation" under the Williams analysis. Short term flings or other casual
relationships do not entail the degree of commitment and shared familial or
financial responsibilities). See also City of Cleveland v. Knipp, 2005 WL 1017620,
at *7 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 10, 2005) (noting that the legislature was treating
cohabiting couples like married couples, although it reasoned that the amendment
did not preclude application of the domestic violence statute to non-marital couples
because "the actual nature of the individual relationship, which is a much broader
concept than its legal status, controls the court's determination of whether an
allegation of domestic violence has been appropriately brought.").
140. See, e.g., Coe v. Coe, 2004 WL 1620787, at *1 (Ohio App. July 21, 2004)
("the explicit language of the divorce decree in the present case must control the
result, and that language requires that the Williams definition of cohabitation is
dispositive.") overruled by Cleveland v. Voies, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio App. Feb. 23,
2006).
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is to treat the cohabitation as a marital equivalent-at least for
certain purposes (e.g., determining if the support-receiving ex-
spouse is still in need of support). 41 If the domestic violence
statute elevates the status of the term "cohabitant"-thus
violating the marriage amendment-then divorce agreements that
treat "cohabitation" and "remarriage" as being equivalent are
unenforceable because they improperly elevate the status of
"cohabitation." Yet, it would be most surprising if proponents of
the marriage amendment intended a provision designed to remove
a disincentive to marriage was rendered unconstitutional by the
marriage amendment itself. Even if the goal of the amendment's
proponents was to "discourage cohabitation in any form-
homosexual, heterosexual or otherwise,"142 this amendment would
not have been the way to achieve that goal.
The Ohio amendment was not particularly well drafted.
However, it does not facially preclude the extension of any
particular benefit. Thus, it would be permissible for the state to
award insurance benefits, 143 parenting benefits,14 4 or domestic
abuse protections. 45  A separate question-one which must be
worked out at a later date in the courts-involves the point at
which the collection of benefits awarded is large enough to
approximate the benefits of marriage and thus is precluded.
141. See Moell v. Moell, 649 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ohio App. 1994) ("The purpose of
spousal support is to provide for the financial needs of the ex-spouse. If the ex-
spouse is living with another person, and that person provides financial support or
is supported, then the underlying need for spousal support is reduced or does not
exist.") (citing Thomas v. Thomas, 602 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ohio App. 1991)).
142. City of Cleveland v. Voies, 2005 WL 1940135, at *7 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 23,
2005), rev'd by 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio App. Feb. 23, 2006).
143. Cf. Nat'l Pride at Work v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040, at *7 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 27, 2005) (holding that health care benefits are not an incident of
marriage).
144. See State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872, 880-81 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 2005)
("Likewise, couples may have adoption rights without approximating the effect of
marriage respecting children.") Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized
that cohabiting, non-marital individuals can grant each other custodial rights,
assuming that doing so would be in the children's best interests. See In re Bonfield,
780 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ohio 2002) ("The parents' agreement to grant custody to a
third party is enforceable subject only to a judicial determination that the
custodian is a proper person to assume the care, training, and education of the
child.").
145. Cf. State v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio App. 2005); State v. Adams, 2005
WL 3196850 (Ohio App. Nov. 28, 2005); City of Cleveland v. Knipp, 2005 WL
1017620 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 10, 2005); State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Misc.
2005); State v. McIntosh, 2005 WL 1940099 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 18, 2005); State
v. Newell, 2005 WL 1364937 (Ohio App. May 31, 2005) (listing courts holding the
amendment and the statute compatible).
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However, that difficult question is not implicated when there is
only one benefit or, perhaps, a few benefits at issue. The fact that
courts tend to be divided over a seemingly easy to answer textual
question does not bode well for interpretations or applications of
the Ohio amendment, in particular, or marriage amendments in
general.
2. Michigan's Amendment Clarified
The Michigan amendment also might have been written more
felicitously. The amendment reads: "To secure and preserve the
benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of
children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall
be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union
for any purpose." 146  The amendment seems to suggest that a
marriage can only exist between one man and one woman and that
Michigan may not recognize a marriage or similar union between
members of the same sex. 147 Furthermore, where a particular
benefit is conditioned on an individual being married, then that
benefit cannot be accorded.
Notwithstanding the contrary claims of commentators, 148 the
Michigan amendment does not preclude the extension of domestic
partnership benefits.149 Those who seek such benefits may neither
claim nor wish to be married. Further, it goes without saying that
marriage involves a great deal more than the possibility of being
covered on a partner's insurance plan.150
It may be that the Michigan amendment was attempting to
preclude the awarding of the incidents of marriage to same-sex
couples, although that could have been more clearly stated.151
However, such an interpretation can only plausibly account for the
146. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (2004).
147. See Baker, supra note 117, at 234 ('"The Michigan text simply states that no
relationship (other than marriage) is to be recognized as a "marriage or similar
union" for any purposes of state law.").
148. But see id. ("Both proponents and opponents of the Michigan measure agree
that 'similar union' precludes not only civil unions, but also domestic partnership
recognition by state and local governments.").
149. See Nat'l Pride at Work v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 27, 2005) (holding that the amendment did not preclude awarding such
benefits).
150. See id. at *4.
151 See, e.g., La. Const. art. XII, § 15 (2004) ("No official or court of the state of
Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any state law to require that marriage
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a union other than
the union of one man and one woman.").
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language of the amendment if the incidents language itself is
understood in a particular way.152
One way to understand an amendment that incorporates a
restriction on the extension of the incidents of marriage is as not
referring to particular benefits at all, but to those rights which are
reserved for married couples. For example, if the ability of one
partner to adopt the child of the other without either being forced
to surrender their parental rights is a right afforded to both
unmarried and married individuals, 153 then such a right is not
appropriately considered an incident of marriage. However, if (1)
there is a right that is only extended to a married individual (e.g.,
the right to elect against a will); and (2) if the state's recognition of
that individual's right also requires the state to recognize that
individual's married or married-like status, then the Michigan
amendment would seem to preclude recognition of that right.
Basically, the Michigan amendment seems to preclude the
courts from extending a right to an unmarried individual if that
right has been reserved by the legislature for married
individuals.15 4  However, the amendment does not bar the
Michigan Legislature from extending a right to married and
unmarried individuals alike.1 55 Where a particular benefit is
awarded to the married and unmarried alike (e.g., the possibility
of two individuals sharing parenting responsibilities or the
possibility that an individual could receive insurance coverage
through a non-marital partner as part of a benefit plan), there is
no need to recognize the relationship between the individuals as a
marriage or even as being marriage-like, thus failing to trigger the
amendment's strictures.
Legislatures can recognize a variety of relationships, making
clear the respects in which they are similar and the respects in
which they are not. For example, Vermont recognizes marriages,
152. For a discussion of some of the different ways that the incidents language
might be read, see supra notes 38, 40, 53-55, 61, 65 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
154. Cf. Nat'l Pride at Work, 2005 WL 3048040 at *4.
Health care benefits are not among the statutory rights or benefits of
marriage. An individual does not receive health care benefits for his or
her spouse as a matter of legal right upon getting married. If a spouse
receives health care benefits, it is as a result of a contractual provision or
policy directive of the employer. Likewise, health care benefits are not
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civil unions, and reciprocal beneficiary status15 6 Marriages and
civil unions are to be distinguished in terms of their symbolic
rather than their practical implications, since civil unions are not
marriages, but nonetheless implicate all of the rights and
responsibilities of marriage. 157 Reciprocal beneficiary status, on
the other hand, should not be considered the equivalent of
marriage or civil union, either in terms of its symbolism or in
terms of its practical effects, because its purposes are so limited.158
Precisely because its purposes and effects are so limited, a
legislature might recognize reciprocal beneficiary status without
violating an amendment limiting the recognition of marital or
marriage-like relationships.
F. The Role of Intent When Interpreting Amendments
When looking at any law which is not clear on its face, the
court has the difficult task of trying to discern the intent behind
it.159 That is a task which is much easier said than done when
seeking to determine the intent behind an amendment.
First, it is not clear whose intent is dispositive-that of the
156. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 8 (2006) ("Marriage is the legally recognized union
of one man and one woman."); 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1201 (2) (2006) ("Civil union
means that two eligible persons have established a relationship pursuant to this
chapter, and may receive the benefits and protections and be subject to the
responsibilities of spouses."); 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (2006).
(a) The purpose of this chapter is to provide two persons who are blood-
relatives or related by adoption the opportunity to establish a consensual
reciprocal beneficiaries relationship so they may receive the benefits and
protections and be subject to the responsibilities that are granted to
spouses in the following specific areas:
(1) Hospital visitation and medical decision-making under 18 V.S.A.
§ 1853;
(2) Decision-making relating to anatomical gifts under 18 V.S.A.
§ 5240;
(3) Decision-making relating to disposition of remains under 18 V.S.A.
§ 5220;
(4) Advance directives under chapter 111 of Title 18;
(5) Patient's bill of rights under 18 V.S.A. chapter 42;
(6) Nursing home patient's bill of rights under 33 V.S.A. chapter 73;
(7) Abuse prevention under 15 V.S.A. chapter 21.
(b) This chapter shall not be construed to create any spousal benefits,





159. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
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framers or those voting for it.160 Even if one decided whose intent
was dispositive, it is difficult to determine the content of that
intent.
Ohio courts struggled with this issue. For example, one court
noted the following:
In the official exit poll on election night, 27 percent of the
voters said they supported full marriage rights [for same-sex
couples], 35 percent supported civil unions, and only 27
percent opposed any legal rights for same-sex couples. In other
words, the voters approved a measure opposed substantively
by 62 percent of the very same voters. 161
The court noted that CNN exit polling nationally "revealed
the same kind of severely conflicted results ... "162 However,
rather than use that information to help inform the meaning of
the amendment (e.g., by suggesting that the amendment must be
construed very narrowly), the court simply suggested that "many,
if not a majority, lacked an understanding of the Amendment's full
content and import when casting their ballots."' 63
That same court quoted some of the campaign material which
suggested, inter alia, that the amendment "does not interfere in
any way with government benefits granted to persons in non-
marital homosexual relationships, so long as the government does
not grant those benefits to such persons specifically for the reason
that the relationship is one that seeks to imitate marriage."164 Of
course, were this an accurate characterization of the amendment,
the government could grant a variety of benefits to individuals in
non-marital relationships as long as it was doing so for some
reason other than that the relationship was marriage-like. For
example, the government could offer domestic partner benefits if it
felt that doing so was important when competing to hire and
retain the most talented people. 65 Parental rights for non-marital
160. See State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872, 877 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2005).
161. City of Cleveland v. Knipp, 2005 WL 1017620, *5 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 10,
2005) (citing Thomas Oliphant, The Gay Marriage Deception, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
November 7, 2004."), abrogated by State v. Burk, 2005 WL 786212, *5 (Ohio Ct.
Com. P1. Mar. 23, 2005) (The court held that "no person in an unmarried




164. Id. at *4.
165. Cf William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A
Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961, 968 (noting that "Montgomery
County's provision [regarding domestic partnership benefits] says: 'Providing
domestic partner benefits will significantly enhance the County's ability to recruit
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partners could be recognized because that could promote the
interests of children in a variety of tangible and non-tangible
ways. 166 Indeed, even recognizing a duty of support for a non-
marital partner or requiring an equal division of property acquired
during a non-marital relationship 167  might be justified by
appealing to the protection of the public fisc that might thereby
occur. 168
Both the polling and the campaign literature of those
supporting the amendment counseled in favor of a narrow
construction of the amendment. 169  Of course, if one were to
emphasize some of the material opposing the amendment, then
one might construe it broadly.170 To some extent, Ohio courts
differed from Michigan courts with respect to the reach of the
amendment because they disagreed about (1) whether the
and retain highly qualified employees and will promote employee loyalty and
workplace diversity."').
166. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Mass. 1993).
Adoption will not result in any tangible change in Tammy's daily life; it
will, however, serve to provide her with a significant legal relationship
which may be important in her future. At the most practical level,
adoption will entitle Tammy to inherit from Helen's family trusts and from
Helen and her family under the law of intestate succession (G.L. c. 210, §
6), to receive support from Helen, who will be legally obligated to provide
such support (G.L. c. 209C, § 9; G.L. c. 273, § 1 [1992 ed.] ), to be eligible
for coverage under Helen's health insurance policies, and to be eligible for
social security benefits in the event of Helen's disability or death (42
U.S.C. § 402[d] [1988]).
Of equal, if not greater significance, adoption will enable Tammy to
preserve her unique filial ties to Helen in the event that Helen and Susan
separate, or Susan predeceases Helen.
Id.
167. See infra notes 194-96196, 199-201, 202 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the ALI domestic partnership recommendations.
168. Cf. Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage'" Reconsidering the Duty of
Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 17 (2003) ("having one spouse as
the first line of recourse to provide financial support for the other protects the
public fisc").
169. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
170. See City of Cleveland v. Voies, 2005 WL 1940135, *5 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 23,
2005), rev'd by 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio App. Feb. 23, 2006).
The League of Women Voters of the Cincinnati area also distributed
literature which listed as one of its "cons": "The amendment would
invalidate locally approved decisions (for example, in Cleveland Heights
and at The Ohio State University) to extend recognition and benefits to
same-sex couples; moreover, the amendment would likely jeopardize
adoptions, custody orders, wills, powers of attorney, and other legal
arrangements that 'approximate the effect' of marriage for either same-sex
or unmarried opposite-sex couples."
Id. (citing LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, BROCHURE; ISSUE 1 GENERAL ELECTION
(Nov. 2, 2004)).
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proponents' versus the opponents' stated views accurately
characterized the amendment's reach, and (2) whether only the
official descriptions of the amendment should be considered. 171
When attempting to interpret the Michigan amendment, the
National Pride at Work court explained:
The words should be given their plain meaning at the time of
ratification. The meaning must be that which realizes the
intent of the people who ratified the Constitution. Where the
text is plain and unambiguous, further construction is
unnecessary. However, to clarify the meaning when necessary
to determine the intent of the people, consideration must be
given to the circumstances surrounding the provision's
adoption and the purpose sought to be accomplished. 172
Regrettably, it seems that very few of the amendments are
viewed as being unambiguous. The Kentucky amendment, which
reads a "status identical or substantially similar to that of
marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized," 173 is thought to be sufficiently ambiguous so as to
171. Compare Nat'l Pride at Work v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 27, 2005) with State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872, 877 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1.
2005).
The official ballot argument written by Issue 1 proponents specifically
stated, "Issue 1 does not interfere in any way with the individual choices of
citizens as to private relationships they desire to enter and maintain."
The court notes that while these statements are the opinions of the
proponents who used the initiative process, they help the court interpret
what would otherwise be unclear. In contrast, the court does not believe
that statements of those who opposed Issue One (as this amendment
appeared on the ballot) have value in a situation like this. Opponents'
views are not necessarily motivated by concerns of legal accuracy as
opposed to preelection hyperbole.
Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d at 877.
172. Nat'l Pride at Work, 2005 WL 3048040 at *3.
173. Ky. CONST. § 233A (2004). While the Kentucky amendment seems clear on
its face, it may nonetheless be construed overbroadly. Cf. Wood v. Comm'r. ex rel.
Grayson, 2005 WL 1258921, *3 (Ky. Cir. Ct. May 26, 2005), rev'd, 2006 WL
440341.
[Tihe Plaintiffs charge that the electorate was unable to discern from the
language of the amendment, the impact upon: (1) suits for wrongful death,
(2) intestate inheritance, (3) hospital visitation, (4) medical decisions, (5)
decision making capacity for burial and funeral arrangements, (6)
protection under Kentucky's domestic violence statutes for spouse abuse,
(7) the ability of businesses and local governments to provide health
insurance or bereavement leave to domestic partners, and (8) the legal
status of existing contractual agreements between unmarried individuals
such as durable powers of attorney, health surrogate designations,
designations of guardianship, and adoption agreements . ... This Court
agrees with the Plaintiffs' contention that the above enumerated relational
and legal rights and responsibilities may be affected by the passage of the
Marriage Amendment. This Court is not particularly persuaded by the
generalized response to these issues, as exemplified, "[tihe amendment
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preclude the legislature from according hospital visitation rights
to non-marital partners. 174 Further, the Nebraska amendment,
which reads, "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman shall
be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of
the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other
similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in
Nebraska, 175 is thought to be sufficiently ambiguous that it may
preclude the legislature from giving a non-marital partner the
right to dispose of a deceased partner's remains. 176  If these
amendments contain ambiguity sufficient to allow such broad
interpretations, then almost any of the amendments can be
construed in a very broad manner.
To make matters even more confusing, the background for
these amendments is capable of being interpreted in vastly
differing ways. Some courts considered the national context in
which the amendment was adopted, e.g., that the Goodridge77
decision had been recently decided, 178 which might mean that
state marriage amendments should be narrowly construed to
preclude the recognition of same-sex marriage.1 79 Other courts
pointed to the emergence of a national movement to strengthen
marriage18 0 and then concluded that the amendment's purpose
does not prohibit employers from giving domestic partner benefits, if that
is what they feel is in their best interest." See Attorney General's
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Judgment on
the Pleadings, pp. 3-4.
Id.
174. Wood, 2005 WL 1258921 at *3.
175. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (1999).
176. See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D.
Neb. 2005).
177. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that the state's same-sex marriage ban violated state constitutional guarantees).
178. State v. Newell, 2005 WL 1364937, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2005).
We concur with appellee that the intent of the Defense of Marriage
Amendment was to prohibit same sex marriage. The Defense of Marriage
Amendment was specifically adopted in response to the decision of the
Massachusetts' Supreme Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health (2003), 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941[,] that the Massachusetts'
law limiting the protections, benefits and obligations of civil marriage to
individuals of opposite sexes lacked a rational basis and violated state
constitutional equal protection principles.
Id.
179. City of Cleveland v. Voies, 2005 WL 1940135, at *7 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 23,
2005), rev'd by 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio App. Feb. 23, 2006) (noting "the growing




was to discourage all forms of non-marital cohabitation.18 1 As a
separate matter, some courts noted that the voters supported the
amendment after being warned that it was ambiguous and capable
of a broad interpretation, as if those voters had thereby assumed
the risk of a broad interpretation.1 8 2
The marriage amendments have created an intolerable
situation, both because of the utter uncertainty regarding their
reach and because of the fundamental nature of the rights which
hang in the balance. Both plain meaning and public policy are
being ignored in order to offer broad constructions.1 8 3 While courts
may eventually limit the damage caused by these amendments,
the harm potentially caused to innocent individuals in the
meantime simply cannot be justified.
G. A Veiled Attack on the American Law Institute?
It is quite clear that many of the marriage amendments,
whether broadly or narrowly construed, preclude the recognition of
same-sex marriages or civil unions. What is not sufficiently
appreciated, however, is that a broad construction of these
amendments may preclude legislatures from adopting many of the
recommendations of the American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations.1 8 4
Indeed, such a reading may impede states from adopting or
enforcing their own version of Marvin v. Marvin. 18 5
In Marvin, the California Supreme Court explained that:
Adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual
relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to
181. See id. at *8 ("the fact that there is a political climate which disparages gay
marriage and any non-traditional marital structures, suggests strongly that the
intent of the Amendment was to eliminate any state-sanctioned relationships that
are not traditional marriages").
182. See id. at *4-5 (noting that the Governor had warned that the amendment
was an ambiguous invitation to litigation that will result in unintended
consequences for senior citizens and for any two persons who share living
accommodations. There will be as many interpretations of the words, "[Intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage," as there are
judges in the state of Ohio (citing Governor Bob Taft News Release of October 13,
2004)).
183. See, e.g., State v. Burk, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2005)
(suggesting that domestic violence statutes can be applied to non-marital
cohabitants without violating the state's marriage amendment); State v. Adams,
2005 WL 3196859 (Ohio Ct. ApD. Nov. 28. 2005).
184184. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2003) [hereinfter "PRINCIPLES"].
185. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
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contract respecting their earnings and property rights. Of
course, they cannot lawfully contract to pay for the
performance of sexual services, for such a contract is, in
essence, an agreement for prostitution and unlawful for that
reason. But they may agree to pool their earnings and to hold
all property acquired during the relationship in accord with
the law governing community property . .. . So long as the
agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious
consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as
they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing
such agreements. 8
6
Basically, the California Supreme Court suggested that non-
marital partners can agree-as a matter of contract-to divide
property or provide partner support if their relationship
dissolves.1 8 7  As long as the agreement is not based upon
meretricious considerations (e.g., the provision of sexual services),
the agreement is enforceable even if made outside of the context of
marriage. 88  Some states have followed California's lead. 8 9
However, the fact that broadly construing the marriage
amendments might preclude enforcement of Marvin agreements
has not received enough attention.
The claim that the enforceability of Marvin agreements is put
into jeopardy by the marriage amendments might seem
surprising. After all, Marvin was decided thirty years ago' 90 and
is not likely viewed as a new threat requiring the passage of a
state constitutional amendment to prevent its implementation.
Nonetheless, a more recent proposal by the American Law
Institute ("ALI"), which goes beyond Marvin palimony suits' 91 in
several respects, 192 might well have motivated some to press for
marriage amendments. 93  Further, if the amendments are
186. Id. at 116.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Compare Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090 (R.I. 2002) (permitting case
involving alleged contract to divide property between domestic partners to
proceed), with Estate of Reaves v. Owen, 744 So.2d 799, 802 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
("palimony is not recognized in Mississippi since it is void as against public policy"
(citations omitted)).
190. Marvin v. Marvin 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
191. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1110 (6th ed. 1990) (defining palimony as a
term that "has meaning similar to 'alimony' except that award, settlement or
agreement arises out of nonmarital relationship of parties (i.e., nonmarital
partners)"); see also Estate of Reaves, 744 So.2d at 802 ("Palimony gives unmarried
persons a right to enforce a property division when the relationship dissolves.").
192. See infra notes 194-96, 199-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the ALI proposal.
193. For secondary literature critical of the ALI proposal, see, for example, Lynn
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interpreted to preclude adoption of the ALI proposal, they might
also be interpreted to preclude the enforcement of Marvin
agreements.
The ALI suggests that individuals who are domestic
partners 94 be treated as having many of the same rights and
obligations as marital partners. 195 For example, the ALI defines
"domestic-partnership property"1 96 and then suggests that it
"should be divided according to the principles set forth for the
division of marital property." 97 The ALI also suggests that with
certain exceptions, "a domestic partner is entitled to compensatory
payments on the same basis as a spouse"'9 8 in the event the
relationship dissolves. Domestic partners can opt out of these
obligations. 199  However, if they choose not to, they have
significant rights and obligations with respect to each other.200
That said, the ALI is not offering a new version of common-law
marriage under another name.20 ' As the ALI explains:
Where recognized, common-law marriage is fully equivalent to
duly licensed ceremonial marriage. In terms of legal incidents,
there is no distinction between a lawful common-law marriage
and a lawful ceremonial marriage. By contrast, although
American law has recognized inter se claims of domestic
partners, it has generally declined to establish rights with
respect to third parties and the state. Similarly, these
Principles, by their limited scope, are confined to the inter se
claims of domestic partners. Thus, the recognition of inter se
claims of domestic partners in these Principles does not revive
D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique Of The American Law Institute's
"Domestic Partners" Proposal, 2001 BYU. L. REV. 1189 (2001).
194. PRINCIPLES, supra note 184 at § 6.03(1) ("domestic partners are two persons
of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period
of time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple").
195. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
196. PRINCIPLES, supra note 184 at § 6.04(1) (explaining that with one exception,
"property is domestic-partnership property if it would be marital property under
Chapter 4, had the domestic partners been married to one another during the
domestic-partnership period").
197. Id. at § 6.05.
198. Id. at § 6.06(1)(a).
199. Id. at § 6.01(2) (suggesting that with certain exceptions a "contract between
domestic partners that (i) waives or limits claims that would otherwise arise under
this Chapter ... is enforceable according to its terms and displaces any
inconsistent claims under this Chapter").
200. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
201. PRINCIPLES, supra note 184 at § 6.01 cmt. a ("This Chapter governs
financial claims between parties to a non-marital relationship. It addresses the
legal obligations that domestic partners, as defined for purposes of this Chapter,
have toward one another at the dissolution of their relationship. Nothing in this
Chapter creates claims against any other persons or the state.").
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the doctrine of common-law, marriage in jurisdictions that
have abolished it.202
Thus, the ALI distinguishes domestic partnership from
common-law marriage by noting that domestic partners have
rights and obligations vis a vis each other, but that domestic
partnership status-unlike common-law marriage-has no
implications for third parties such as employers or the state.203
While an employer might decide to extend benefits to domestic
partners as a matter of equity or as a way of attracting or keeping
good employees, 20 4 there is no legal obligation to do so.205
The ALl proposal has a variety of attractive features. 20 6 It is
designed to bring about a fairer distribution of goods acquired
during a qualifying relationship, 20 7 and may even help society
avoid shouldering certain burdens in the event that a domestic
partnership relationship ends and one of the parties has no assets
or means of support.20 8 However, the point here is not to discuss
whether particular state legislatures should adopt the ALI
recommendations in whole or in part,20 9 but merely to suggest that
a broad reading of the marriage amendment might preclude a
state legislature from adopting these recommendations even were
the legislature to believe that doing so is good public policy. If a
marriage amendment precludes a non-marital partner from
receiving insurance benefits or having the ability to determine the
disposition of a non-marital loved one's remains, 210 then the
amendment would likely also be interpreted as precluding
domestic partner support or the distribution of domestic
partnership property. By the same token, the amendment might
well be interpreted to preclude a Marvin arrangement where non-
marital partners treat their relationship as a marriage for support
or property division purposes at dissolution. However, if the
marriage amendment is read narrowly, then it might not preclude
adoption of the ALl recommendations or enforcement of Marvin
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See supra note 165.
205. Cf. Rusack v. Harsha, 470 F.Supp. 285, 291 (1978) (stating that a
Restatement published by the ALI is not binding on the court).
206. See infra notes 207-08.
207. PRINCIPLES, supra note 184 at § 6.02(1).
208. See id. at § 6.02(2).
209. See generally Mark Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI Domestic
Partners Recommendation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1135 (2001) (listing reasons why
adopting the recommendations would be good public policy).
210. See infra accompanying text note 222.
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agreements, since there are a whole host of third party benefits
that are associated with marriage, but are not associated with
Marvin agreements or ALI domestic partnerships. 211
Most, if not all, of the state marriage amendments cannot
plausibly be construed as limiting the power of the state
legislature to incorporate either Marvin agreements or the ALI
domestic partners proposal into local law. None of the
amendments include any language that refers to or even alludes to
Marvin agreements or the ALI domestic partners proposal, and
should not be broadly construed to preclude the state from
effectuating policies which will benefit both the state and many
non-traditional families.
II. The Constitutional Implications of the State Marriage
Amendments
When construed broadly, the marriage amendments are
vulnerable to federal constitutional attack on equal protection and
due process grounds. Not only should many of these amendments
be construed narrowly in light of their plain language and good
public policy, but also to reduce their vulnerability to being
invalidated as a violation of federal constitutional guarantees.
A. Marriage Amendments Violate Equal Protection
Guarantees
State marriage amendments implicate a variety of
constitutional concerns, especially when they are construed
broadly. They impose unjustifiable burdens on the state, society,
and individuals and violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection guarantees.
Recently, Nebraska's marriage amendment was struck down
in federal district court in Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v.
Bruning.21 2 The court made clear that it was not striking down
the amendment because it precluded same-sex marriage, 213 but
because the "amendment goes far beyond merely defining
marriage as between a man and a woman."214 The court noted
211. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the
ALI provision is not simply a recommendation that common-law marriage be
recognized.
212. 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005), rev'd 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
213. See id. at 995 n.II ("The court need not decide whether and to what extent
Nebraska can define or limit the state's statutory definition of marriage.").
214. Id. at 995.
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that that the amendment "potentially prohibits or at least inhibits
people, regardless of sexual preference, from entering into
numerous relationships or living arrangements that could be
interpreted as a same-sex relationship 'similar to' marriage,"
215
and struck down the amendment because of its "expansive
reach."216
Understanding that the "incidents of marriage vary,"217 the
Bruning court explained that many "social or associational
arrangements run the risk of running afoul of the broad
prohibitions" 218 of the amendment. Of course, the Nebraska
amendment does not expressly include a prohibition on extending
the incidents of marriage to non-marital couples. Instead, it
suggests that the "uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil
union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex
relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska."
219
Nonetheless, the Nebraska Attorney General interpreted the
amendment as precluding the extension of any rights which might
arise as a consequence of marriage. 220 This not only seems to
preclude awarding the incidents of marriage, but might be
interpreted to include any rights arising from marriage, 221 even
those not traditionally considered as the "incidents of marriage."222
The Bruning court pointed out that the Nebraska
215. Id.
216. Id. at 996
217. Id. at 995.
218. Id.
219. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (1999).
220. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
Because "the rights being created are placed on the same plane as rights
which arise as a consequence of the marital relationship," the Attorney
General found that the proposed legislation "would be giving legal effect to
a same sex relationship, thereby validating or recognizing it," which would
run counter to Section 29.
Id.
221. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
222. Cf. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 999-1000.
Plaintiffs seek only "a level playing field" that would permit them to access
the Nebraska Unicameral to lobby for legal protections that have already
been permitted in other states. Plaintiffs assert that they seek only to
advocate to members of the Unicameral for passage of legislation that
would make domestic partners responsible for each others' living expenses;
allow a partner hospital visitation; provide for a partner to make decisions
regarding health care, organ donations and funeral arrangements; permit
bereavement leave; permit private employer benefits; allow survivorship,




amendment bore a striking resemblance to the Colorado
amendment 223 struck down by the United States Supreme Court
in Romer v. Evans.224  When striking down the Colorado
amendment-which operated to "repeal and forbid all laws or
policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from
discrimination by every level of Colorado government"225-the
Romer Court suggested that the amendment was "at once too
narrow and too broad,"226 because "it identifie[d] persons by a
single trait and then denies them protection across the board."227
The range of benefits that could not be sought absent repeal of the
Nebraska amendment was extremely large.228
The Bruning court mentioned another similarity between the
Nebraska and Colorado amendments, namely, that the court could
only conclude that "the intent and purpose of the amendment is
based on animus against... [the affected] class."229 This mirrors
the Romer Court's observation that the Colorado amendment's
"sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it
that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects."230
In some ways, the Nebraska amendment was especially
vulnerable to being struck down as a violation of equal protection
guarantees. This was because it stated that the "uniting of two
persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or
other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or
recognized in Nebraska."231 In effect, the state was distinguishing
among non-marital relationships-precluding the recognition of
223. Id. at 1002 ("The court finds that Section 29 is indistinguishable from the
Colorado constitutional amendment at issue in Romer. Although not mentioned by
name, the State has focused primarily on the same class of its citizens as did
Colorado.").
224. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
225. Id. at 629.
226. Id. at 633. See also Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (noting that the reach
of the Nebraska amendment "is at once too broad and too narrow to satisfy its
purported purpose of defining marriage, preserving marriage, or fostering
procreation and family life. It is tbo narrow in that it does not address other
potential threats to the institution of marriage, such as divorce. It is too broad in
that it reaches not only same-sex 'marriages,' but many other legitimate
associations, arrangements, contracts, benefits and policies").
227. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
228. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
229. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
230. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
231. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (1999).
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same-sex, but not different-sex, non-marital relationships. 232 Even
those seeking to promote marriage might have trouble justifying
this kind of differential treatment.
Many of the amendments do not focus on same-sex non-
marital relationships in particular but instead preclude the
recognition of non-marital relationships more generally. 233
Perhaps this more-general focus is offered because the proponents
wished to discourage non-marital cohabitation more generally, 234
or because they wished to avoid any difficulties that might arise
from targeting same-sex couples in particular. 235
In her concurrence to Lawrence v. Texas,236 Justice O'Connor
noted that one of the defects in Texas's same-sex sodomy
prohibition was that the law resulted in "discrimination against
homosexuals as a class in an array of areas outside the criminal
law."237 She explained that when a law exhibits "a desire to harm
a politically unpopular group, [the Court has] applied a more
searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws
under the Equal Protection Clause."238  She further pointed out
that the Court has "been most likely to apply rational basis review
to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
where ... the challenged legislation inhibits personal
relationships." 239
Marriage amendments as a general matter preclude same-
sex couples from marrying240 and are designed to-and do--inhibit
personal relationships. 241 Further, it is difficult to maintain that
the refusal to recognize same-sex marriages and civil unions does
232. Cf. Baker, supra note 117, at 230.
This approach, which singled out same-sex relationships, has been
recently challenged on equal protection grounds in federal court, not
because same-sex relationships are denied the protections of marriage, but
under an argument that the amendment treats them differently than
other (heterosexual) non-marital relationships.
Id.
233. See ARK. CONST. amend. 83 (2004); KY. CONST. § 233A (2004); NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 29 (1999); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (2004); S.D. CONST. art. 21, § 9 (2005);
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (2005); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (2004).
234. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
235. See infra notes 237-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
possible constitutional ramifications of targeting on the basis of orientation.
236. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 584.
238. Id. at 580.
239. Id.
240. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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not somehow target the basis of orientation. Such classifications
should be subject-at the very least-to heightened rational basis
review. 242
When discussing statutes which target orientation, Justice
O'Connor implied that same-sex marriage bans had the potential
to withstand constitutional scrutiny.243 Yet, as Justice Scalia
suggests, Justice O'Connor does not mention any legitimate state
interests which might justify same-sex marriage bans. 244 Further,
even if the state came up with a reason capable of withstanding
scrutiny, whether the state could also justify refusing to extend
the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples is a separate issue. 245
Finally, it seems even more difficult to justify the policy which
Nebraska tried to effectuate-precluding same-sex, but not
different-sex, non-marital couples from receiving benefits from the
state.246
It is difficult to understand how same-sex marriage bans can
be reconciled with contemporary equal protection jurisprudence. 247
242. See Mark Strasser, Monogamy, Licentiousness, Desuetude, and Mere
Tolerance: The Multiple Misinterpretations of Lawrence v. Texas, 15 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 95, 124-33 (2005) (discussing why heightened rational basis
review is too weak a standard).
243. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor J., concurring) ("Unlike the moral
disapproval of same-sex relations-the asserted state interest in this case-other
reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval
of an excluded group.").
244. See id. at 601-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples. Justice O'Connor seeks to preserve them
by the conclusory statement that "preserving the traditional institution of
marriage" is a legitimate state interest. But "preserving the traditional
institution of marriage" is just a kinder way of describing the State's moral
disapproval of same-sex couples. Texas's interest in § 21.06 could be
recast in similarly euphemistic terms: "preserving the traditional sexual
mores of our society." In the jurisprudence Justice O'Connor has
seemingly created, judges can validate laws by characterizing them as
"preserving the traditions of society" (good); or invalidate them by
characterizing them as "expressing moral disapproval" (bad).
Id.
245. Cf. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the Vermont
Constitution required that same-sex couples be eligible to receive the benefits of
marriage, even if the state had to create a new status in order to effectuate that
requirement).
246. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (arguing that a state
constitutional amendment preventing legislation to protect against discrimination
based on sexual orientation violates equal protection). Precluding benefits to same-
sex couples would very similar to the facts in Romer.
247. See generally Mark Strasser, Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage Bans: On
Constitutional Interpretation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1003,
1021-27 (2004).
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It is even harder to see how equal protection guarantees can
permit a state to refuse to extend to same-sex, non-marital couples
and their families the benefits which they need as much as, if not
more than, comparably situated different-sex couples and their
families. Same-sex couples, like different-sex couples, are raising
children and caring for elderly parents. Basically, such families
need and deserve the same protections and benefits that different-
sex families need and deserve. Both the states and these
individual families are harmed when these benefits and
protections are not provided.
Suppose that a state marriage amendment is not construed
to impose burdens on same-sex couples in particular, but instead
on non-marital couples in general. Even such an amendment, if
broadly construed, might be held to violate equal protection
guarantees. For example, in Phelps v. Johnson, an Ohio Court of
Common Pleas struck down part of the Ohio constitutional
amendment after broadly construing it.24s The court interpreted
the amendment to preclude application of the Domestic Violence
Statute to unmarried cohabitants and then suggested that
"differentiation between the protections provide[d] married
victims of domestic violence, vis a vis unmarried victims, bears no
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest."249 After all,
the Ohio Legislature had recognized that special domestic violence
dangers arise in the context of relationships, and that these
dangers require specific legislative action.25 0
Arguably, the refusal to extend domestic violence protection
to non-marital cohabitants is an example of treating relevantly
similar parties dissimilarly without sufficient justification, and is
the kind of differential treatment that the Equal Protection Clause
is designed to prevent. 25 1
It is unclear whether the kind of analysis offered in Phelps
will be upheld on review, especially because the amendment-
when construed narrowly-would avoid the difficulties suggested
in the Phelps opinion. Nonetheless, the opinion at least suggests
that there may be equal protection difficulties if the amendment is
248. See Phelps v. Johnson, 2005 WL 4651081, at *3 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 28,
2005).
249. See id.
250. See State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (Ohio 1997) (discussing the
Ohio Supreme Court's recognition that the legislature had found that individuals
in relationships required special protection from domestic violence).
251. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(stating "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.").
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construed very broadly-a point which other courts have also
suggested.252 Further, if the Phelps analysis is rejected on the
theory that (1) a statutory classification distinguishing between
marital and non-marital relationships must only be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest to survive rational basis
review, and (2) the promotion of marriage is a legitimate end and
a statute offering special protections when domestic abuse occurs
within the context of marriage creates a greater incentive to
marry, then there may well be other implications which many
amendment supporters may live to regret.
Suppose that someday in the distant future the United States
Supreme Court were to hold that same-sex marriage is protected
by federal constitutional guarantees. Such an occurrence would
likely make unenforceable all of the state constitutional
amendments precluding same-sex couples from marrying.253 Yet,
it is unclear how some of the provisions restricting non-marital
benefits would be construed. After all, if the sole concern had been
to preclude same-sex couples from receiving marital benefits, the
amendment might have been worded like Georgia's. 254
252. Cf. City of Cleveland v. Voies, 2005 WL 1940135, at *3 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 23,
2005), rev'd, 2006 WL 440341 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Feb. 23, 2006).
Finally, in an alternative argument, the City contends that a judicial
interpretation which renders void that portion of the domestic violence
statute that protects unmarried, cohabiting victims would violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution's 14th Amendment. This
is due to the fact that unmarried, cohabiting victims would not be afforded
the additional statutory protections that the domestic violence statute
provides a married victim or cohabiting victim who has children with the
offender. If it is in fact determined that the Equal Protection Clause is
violated, the city suggests that the Amendment, rather than the domestic
violence statute, be found unconstitutional.
Id.
253. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967). When the Court struck
down interracial marriage bans, several state constitutional provisions were
thereby made unenforceable.
254. See GA. CONST. art I, § 4, para. 1 (2004).
(a) This state shall recognize as marriage only the union of man and
woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this
state.
(b) No union between persons of the same sex shall be recognized by this
state as entitled to the benefits of marriage. This state shall not give effect
to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other state or
jurisdiction respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other state or jurisdiction.
The courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or
separate maintenance with respect to any such relationship or otherwise
to consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights arising as a
result of or in connection with such relationship.
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Those amendments which preclude non-marital couples from
receiving benefits might be construed as intended to apply to
same-sex and different-sex, non-marital couples alike and, further,
might be thought of as rationally related to the promotion of
marriage. It might well be that such amendments would not be
struck down on equal protection grounds,255 which might require
individuals to expend time and money to amend their state
constitutions so that non-marital couples and their children could
receive the kinds of benefits that married couples and their
children need. 25 6 It is plausible to believe that many of the
amendment supporters would regret their votes if they precluded
non-marital couples from receiving benefits that same-sex,
married couples enjoy.
B. Broadly Construed Marriage Amendments Violate Due
Process Guarantees
The marriage amendments may implicate due process
guarantees as well. Not only may there be difficulties involved in
the state's refusal to recognize same-sex unions, but there may be
additional issues implicated by a broad construction, which, for
example, requires that certain parental rights established in one
state not be recognized in another.257 Courts should construe the
marriage amendments narrowly to reduce the potential equal
protection and due process difficulties. 258
In Lawrence,259 the United States Supreme Court held that
the Texas law criminalizing same-sex relations was
unconstitutional on due process grounds.260 Such a holding may
affect whether same-sex relationships are protected by the Due
255. Cf. Voies, 2005 WL 1940135, at *3.
256. A separate issue for state courts would be whether the provisions of the
amendments would be severable or whether, instead, the provision reserving
benefits for married couples would never have been approved without the other
provision precluding same-sex couples from marrying.
257. Cf. Chad Graham, Gay in the Red States, THE ADVOCATE 34, Feb. 15, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 2201536.
In Oklahoma, Anne Magro and her partner, Heather Finstuen, have seen
firsthand how quickly lawmakers can take away protections. The couple
joined a lawsuit by Lambda Legal to try to repeal Oklahoma's law against
adoptions by gays, which was signed into law May 4. It outlaws adoptions
by gay and lesbian parents from out of state, even for those who've legally
cemented their adoption rights in other states.
Id.
258. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 272 (2003).
259. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
260. See id. at 578.
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Process Clause because the Court's holding-that same-sex
relations, but not same-sex relationships, are protected by due
process guarantees-would invert the traditional prioritization
that due process guarantees are thought to offer. 261 Indeed, even
the Bowers Court recognized that due process guarantees protect
family relations.262 However, unlike the Lawrence Court, the
Bowers Court failed to recognize that same-sex partners, like
different-sex partners, have relationships. 263
The Bowers Court believed that there was "[n]o connection
between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other. '264 The Lawrence Court chided
the Bowers Court for its "failure to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake,"265 explaining, "[tjo say that the issue in Bowers
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans
the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse."266  The Lawrence Court
understood that same-sex partners engaging in sexual relations
might be doing so in the context of a committed relationship,
where the sexual conduct is "but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring."267
By analogizing same-sex relationships to marital
relationships and holding that adult, consensual, same-sex
relations are constitutionally protected, at least in part, the
Lawrence Court implies that same-sex relationships have
constitutional protection.268 Indeed, Justice Scalia suggests that
the Lawrence "opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional
law that has permitted a distinction to be made between
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition
261. See generally Strasser, supra note 246, at 1017-21 (developing the
argument that the Court inverted the prioritization).
262. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson (316
U.S. 535 1942)).
263. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("That statement, we now conclude, discloses
the Court's own failure to appreciate the liberty at stake. To say that the issue in
Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain conduct demeans the claim the
individual put forward.").
264. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
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in marriage is concerned." 269
Perhaps Justice Scalia is incorrect. In the future, someone
may be able to offer a not-yet-articulated reason to restrict
marriage to different-sex couples-one that is sufficiently
compelling to pass constitutional muster. Even if there is such a
reason, it likely would not justify a refusal to accord same-sex
couples a variety of benefits to which they would be entitled if they
could marry.270
Suppose that the issue of whether the Due Process Clause
protects same-sex unions is bracketed.271 The amendments at
issue might still implicate due process concerns insofar as they
interfere with parent-child relationships.
Once an adoption is final, the parent-child relationship is
treated as if the parent and child are related by blood.272 As the
United States Supreme Court has recognized, the liberty "interest
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by this Court."273  Insofar as the marriage amendments are
interpreted to preclude the recognition of the parental rights of the
unmarried, the due process protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment are triggered. 274
269. Id. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state
interest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct, and if, as the Court coos
(casting aside all pretense of neutrality), "[w]hen sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring," what
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to
homosexual couples exercising "[tihe liberty protected by the
Constitution?"
Id. (citations omitted).
270. Cf. Baker v State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (suggesting that benefits,
although not marriage, had to be extended to same-sex couples).
271. Courts striking down a marriage amendment in part or in whole tended to
do so without speaking to whether the amendment's reserving marriage for
different-sex couples violated constitutional guarantees. See Bruning, 368 F. Supp.
2d 980, 985 n.1 (D. Neb. 2005), rev'd 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) ("The court is not
asked to decide whether a state has the right to define marriage in the context of
same-sex and opposite-sex relationships."); Phelps v. Johnson, 2005 WL 4651081,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 28, 2005) ("the court finds that this Judgment Entry
should not be construed to express any opinion whatsoever regarding the issue of
whether same-sex marriages should be legally recognized in the State of Ohio").
272. See Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Adoptive parents
have all the legal rights ... in their children as natural parents.").
273. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
274. See id.
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In Stanley v. Illinois,275 the Court made clear that the rights
of never-married parents cannot be ignored by the state,276 and the
Court in Troxel v. Granville277 reaffirmed its commitment to that
principle. 27s Those who interpret a state marriage amendment to
prevent the recognition of parental rights of unmarried individuals
invite the courts to strike down the amendment as
unconstitutional.
When suggesting that the marriage amendments may well
implicate due process protections even after bracketing the
constitutionality of precluding same-sex couples from marrying,
the point, of course, is not to deny the importance of the right to
marry or the burden imposed by states precluding same-sex
couples from enjoying that right. On the contrary, as the United
States Supreme Court recognized in Zablocki v. Redhail,279 the
"right to marry is of fundamental importance for all
individuals." 280  Assuming no changes to the Federal
Constitution, 28 1 when some future Court finally recognizes that
the right to marry a same-sex partner is protected by the Federal
Constitution, all states will have to recognize that right.
The Lawrence Court noted:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they
might have been more specific. They did not presume to have
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths
and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke
its principles in their own search for greater freedom. 282
The current Court may not be ready to recognize that same-
sex marriage restrictions, while "once thought necessary and
proper, only serve to oppress." 28 3 However, even if that is true,
both the United States Supreme Court and lower courts should see
275. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
276. See id. at 658.
277. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
278. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
279. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
280. Id. at 384.
281. See generally Symposium, Federal Marriage Amendment: Yes or No?, 2 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 1-198 (2004) (discussing the proposal to amend the Federal
Constitution to preclude same-sex couples from marrying).
282. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-579 (2003).
283. Id. at 579.
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that the marriage amendments-when broadly construed-violate
both equal protection and due process guarantees.
Conclusion
Several states have passed marriage amendments, and it is
safe to assume that more will be passed in the near future. As a
general matter, these amendments are designed to preclude same-
sex couples from marrying. However, the amendments vary
greatly with respect to what they do in addition to that. Thus far,
the courts have had great difficulty in figuring out how to
interpret these amendments. Regrettably, some courts have gone
far beyond the language of the amendments themselves to make
them much more burdensome. This can neither be justified in
terms of the canons of amendment .construction nor good public
policy.
Most, if not all, of the marriage amendments implicate
constitutional guarantees because, at the very least, they target on
the basis of orientation and are designed to inhibit personal
relationships. Broad constructions of these amendments are even
more constitutionally vulnerable because they impose greater
burdens on those adversely affected. Courts considering how to
interpret their own state's marriage amendment have ample
reason to construe them narrowly, including the canon of
interpretation which requires courts, where possible, to offer
interpretations of statutes and amendments which make them in
accord with constitutional requirements. 2 4 In most cases, a broad
interpretation of the state's marriage amendment will not account
for the intentions of those passing it, the language of the
amendment itself, good public policy, constitutional requirements,
or principles of fairness. Judges must do their utmost to reduce
the harm imposed by these amendments, for the sake of society as
a whole and the affected individuals themselves. To do otherwise
would not only involve adding insult to injury, but also shirking
their judicial responsibilities.
284. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 272 (2003) ("Only when it is utterly
unavoidable should we interpret a statute to require an unconstitutional result.").
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